SPINOZA’S TREATISE ON THE CORRECTION OF THE UNDERSTANDING: A CRITICAL STUDY

INTRODUCTION

In what follows I will critically evaluate Spinoza’s argument in his ‘Treatise on the Correction of the Understanding’.

My view is that – original and impressive as Spinoza’s vision is – it is not a rational understanding of the nature of reality.

 

TREATISE ON THE CORRECTION OF THE UNDERSTANDING

(tractatus de intellectus enendatione)

AND ON THE WAY IT MAY BE DIRECTED TOWARDS A TRUE KNOWLEDGE OF THINGS

 

I. ON THE GOOD THINGS WHICH MEN DESIRE FOR THE MOST PART

 

[1] (1) After experience had taught me that all the usual surroundings of social life are vain and futile; seeing that none of the objects of my fears contained in themselves anything either good or bad, except in so far as the mind is affected by them, I finally resolved to inquire whether there might be some real good having power to communicate itself, which would affect the mind singly, to the exclusion of all else: whether, in fact, there might be anything of which the discovery and attainment would enable me to enjoy continuous, supreme, and unending happiness.

what experience has taught Spinoza is that ‘all the usual surroundings of social life are vain and futile’ –we can ask – if that is what experience teaches – isn’t that the end of the story?

 experience also teaches him and that ‘none of the objects of his fears contained in themselves anything good or bad ‘except in so far as the mind is affected by them’

if the effect of an object on the mind is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ – then – presumably there is something in that object which has that effect – if not – the object is irrelevant to the experience of the mind – and if so – what then the source of his fears – the source of experience?

he decides to inquire whether there is ‘some real good having power to communicate itself, which would affect the mind singly, to the exclusion of all else’ – which must mean a ‘good’ that excludes his experience – and if so – one can ask – how could such a good be experienced?

and ‘the discovery and attainment of such a good’ – presumably not through experience –

and with the result of this discovery – to enjoy ‘continuous, supreme, and unending happiness’ – it seems – that cannot be experienced

the question is – if there I something outside of experience – how can it be experienced – how can it be known?

so – this ‘continuous, supreme, and unending happiness’ – is what – nothing more than a fantasy?

 

[2] (1) I say "I finally resolved," for at first sight it seemed unwise willingly to lose hold on what was sure for the sake of something then uncertain. (2) I could see the benefits which are acquired through fame and riches, and that I should be obliged to abandon the quest of such objects, if I seriously devoted myself to the search for something different and new. (3) I perceived that if true happiness chanced to be placed in the former I should necessarily miss it; while if, on the other hand, it were not so placed, and I gave them my whole attention, I should equally fail.

he says here that fame and riches are ‘sure’ relative to his ‘search for the sake of something then uncertain’

surely one would say that the ‘hold on’ fame and riches is anything but ‘certain’ –

and for argument’s sake – let’s say he finds this ‘real good’ – and regards it as a higher good – how would he be obliged to ‘abandon’ any so called ‘lesser goods’ –

like fame and riches?

yes – the question is where to find true happiness –

as Spinoza notes there are options

will it be found in ‘fame and riches’ – or in something ‘new and different’?

this question – and any similar question points straight at the inherent epistemological uncertainty at the heart of any ethical inquiry –

and I would go so far as to say that regardless of any choice that the epistemological uncertainty is undiminished

 hat is to say – that whatever ethical framework we might adopt and however useful it might be seen to be – its logical status is uncertain

Spinoza’s dream of ethical certainty – is really no more than a reaction against the uncertainty of the ethical reality that we in fact experience –

and his pursuit of ‘something new and different’ is therefore a denial of ethical reality

uncertainty can lead to ethical anxiety – and ethical anxiety – can lead to ethical denial –

however – there is another way –

and that is the positive embrace of ethical uncertainty –

and by this – I mean – recognizing that uncertainty is the ground of freedom – freedom to choose – freedom to investigate – freedom to change one’s ethical perspective

we never leave uncertainty but if viewed positively – uncertainty is the source of ethical dynamism

 

[3] (1) I therefore debated whether it would not be possible to arrive at the new principle, or at any rate at a certainty concerning its existence, without changing the conduct and usual plan of my life; with this end in view I made many efforts, in vain. (2) For the ordinary surroundings of life which are esteemed by men (as their actions testify) to be the highest good, may be classed under the three heads--Riches, Fame, and the Pleasures of Sense: with these three the mind is so absorbed that it has little power to reflect on any different good.

how to arrive at a new principle – or the certainty of its existence

well – if you arrive at it – whatever it may be – it exists

the ‘certainty of its existence’?

well first up – you don’t need certainty here – if a principle is proposed – it exists

certainty here – is unnecessary and irrelevant baggage

and the fact is you can arrive at a principle – a new principle – without changing the conduct and usual manner of your life

in terms of any such principle – you may decide to change your conduct and manner of your life – but the principle is there as proposed – exists – whether you change your life or not

do men class the highest good under the three headings of riches – fame – and pleasure of the senses?

whether this is the case or not – is an empirical issue –

we have no attempt by Spinoza to provide any evidence for his claim –

as it stands his claim is no more than his perception – his proposal – and a proposal clearly open to question – open to doubt – and as such uncertain

there may well be human beings who think the highest goods involve riches – fame – and sensual pleasure 

but it is my bet that there are others who give primary value to other things – e.g. – knowledge – understanding – justice and kindness

it strikes me as hopeless to try to generalize here –

I think the best you can do – is ask people what is of most importance to them –

and what you will get in answer here– is just what you get

now one may be absorbed in riches – fame and sensual pleasure – but it just does not follow that anyone so absorbed – would not be able to give genuine and serious attention to any proposal of different goods

if one has an open mind and thinks critically – one is never trapped in any way of thinking – or manner of action

 

[4] (1) By sensual pleasure the mind is enthralled to the extent of quiescence, as if the supreme good were actually attained, so that it is quite incapable of thinking of any other object; when such pleasure has been gratified it is followed by extreme melancholy, whereby the mind, though not enthralled, is disturbed and dulled. (2) The pursuit of honors and riches is likewise very absorbing, especially if such objects be sought simply for their own sake, inasmuch as they are then supposed to constitute the highest good.

Spinoza’s account of the psychology of pleasure here is simplistic

one might well experience pleasure ‘to the extent of quiescence’ – but it does not follow that in such a state one is ‘incapable’ of thinking of any other object – of any other matter –

in fact – it can be argued that there are cases where the experience of pleasure actually opens the mind to new possibilities – that the experience of pleasure is liberating

again – we cannot generalize here –

anyone’s experience – of whatever kind – is an individual matter –

which is to say – to have an idea of how pleasure affects an individual – will be complex – and central to this complexity will be an understanding or consideration of the context – which is itself – no simple matter

and further – characterizing any experience of any kind is a matter open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

it may well be that an individual’s experience of pleasure ‘is followed by extreme melancholy, whereby the mind, though not enthralled, is disturbed and dulled’

but – we cannot generalize from this – to all people’s experience of pleasure – in all circumstances 

as to the pursuit of honors and riches being very absorbing – any concentration on any endeavor is likely to be very absorbing

however – one can be absorbed in a pursuit without regarding it has the highest good – if indeed one even has a concept of the ‘highest good’

 

[5] (1) In the case of fame the mind is still more absorbed, for fame is conceived as always good for its own sake, and as the ultimate end to which all actions are directed. (2) Further, the attainment of riches and fame is not followed as in the case of sensual pleasures by repentance, but, the more we acquire, the greater is our delight, and, consequently, the more are we incited to increase both the one and the other; on the other hand, if our hopes happen to be frustrated we are plunged into the deepest sadness. (3) Fame has the further drawback that it compels its votaries to order their lives according to the opinions of their fellow-men, shunning what they usually shun, and seeking what they usually seek.

some might regard fame as good for its own sake – however there may well be those who see fame as a means to other ends – e,g. – a famous actor may regard his or her fame as the key to more work – greater roles – and even higher pay

is it the case that the more riches and fame we attain the more we are incited to increase both?

perhaps for some that is the case – 

however – one can easily imagine there are those who say ‘enough is enough’

and could someone who’s life was wrecked by fame – not repent his / her pursuit of it?

I imagine there are those who hoped for fame – but are not ‘plunged in deepest sadness’ when their hopes are dashed –

perhaps they just accept that that is how the cards fell

and I think you will find there are so-called famous people who while understanding the value of fame – manage to live private lives and on their own terms

Spinoza’s opinions here are quite valid – as valid as anyone else’s opinions

what is clear though – is that he seems unable or unwilling to put them to question – and as a result – all we get from him here is a narrow-minded dogmatism

 

[6] (1) When I saw that all these ordinary objects of desire would be obstacles in the way of a search for something different and new--nay, that they were so opposed thereto, that either they or it would have to be abandoned, I was forced to inquire which would prove the most useful to me: for, as I say, I seemed to be willingly losing hold on a sure good for the sake of something uncertain. (2) However, after I had reflected on the matter, I came in the first place to the conclusion that by abandoning the ordinary objects of pursuit, and betaking myself to a new quest, I should be leaving a good, uncertain by reason of its own nature, as may be gathered from what

has been said, for the sake of a good not uncertain in its nature (for I sought for a fixed good), but only in the possibility of its attainment.

‘these ordinary objects of desire’ – need not be ‘obstacles in the way of a search for something different and knew’ – they may well be in Spinoza’s case the springboard for the search for something different and new

one is not confined in one’s thinking to what one does desire – we can think outside of our current – and even habitual desires – 

but to do so requires a critical intelligence –

and this is no specialist skill – anyone who thinks – is able to question – to doubt – and to explore the uncertainties of their thoughts and actions –

and furthermore – it is not an all or nothing situation – you do not have to abandon your practices – in-order-to – consider different and new perspectives –

a rational intelligence will seek to understand the advantages and disadvantages of the different ways of dealing with the question of the good – and of the good life

again – there is no ‘sure good’ – any proposed good – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

Spinoza it seems finally accepts the uncertainty of the ordinary objects of pursuit –

‘However, after I had reflected on the matter, I came in the first place to the conclusion that by abandoning the ordinary objects of pursuit, and betaking myself to a new quest, I should be leaving a good, uncertain by reason of its own nature, as may be gathered from what has been said …’

he goes on here to say –

‘for the sake of a good not uncertain in its nature (for I sought for a fixed good), but only in the possibility of its attainment.’

what is clear here is that he desires certainty – and thinks that because he desires it – it can be attained

just because you want something – it doesn’t follow that it can be attained – or even that it exists –

and he is assuming that because he has now recognized that ‘the ordinary objects of desire’ – are uncertain

the alternative must be certain

so – it is clear – that from the outset he holds with certainty –

one might quip that he is just uncertain – about what is certain –

which is little more than to pretend certainty – in the face of it opposite

and the thing is – if there is an opposite to uncertainty (i.e. certainty) – that cannot be assumed on the basis some word play – rather it must be argued for and established

certainty at this stage of Spinoza’s argument – is no more than a desire – a wish

I think this desire for certainty – understandable as it may be – is nevertheless naïve – and furthermore – logically and philosophically baseless

if we are rational – any proposal – and hypothesis – any way of thinking – or indeed – any manner of acting – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

as I see it – against this – yes – you can search for certainty – and even profess to have found it – many have done just this – and many still do it and claim the prize – but the price paid for such an exercise in this delusion – is a closed mind with the doubtful comfort of blind ignorance 

still – to be fair I give Spinoza the benefit of doubt here– perhaps he is on to something – we will just have to see how it all plays out

 

[7] (1) Further reflection convinced me that if I could really get to the root of the matter I should be leaving certain evils for a certain good. (2) I thus perceived that I was in a state of great peril, and I compelled myself to seek with all my strength for a remedy, however uncertain it might be; as a sick man struggling with a deadly disease, when he sees that death will surely be upon him unless a remedy be found, is compelled to seek a remedy with all his strength, inasmuch as his whole hope lies therein. (3) All the objects pursued by the multitude not only bring no remedy that tends to preserve our being, but even act as hindrances, causing the death not seldom of those who possess them, and always of those who are possessed by them.

so – the ‘argument’ is that the ordinary objects of desire – ‘causing the death not seldom of those who possess them, and always of those are possessed by them’

people die – regardless of their beliefs – or moral perspectives

and if it is to be put that a belief or moral perspective caused a death – the matter requires argument and evidence

this ‘death argument’ is without empirical foundation – is nothing more than blatant rhetoric – and quite simply ridiculous –

Spinoza need not have run this pathetic excuse for an ‘argument’ – and instead got down to the real business of proposing an alternative view 

his attempt to kill off and bury the opposition – tells us that he has no understanding or tolerance for any different view of the goal(s) of life – than his own – not that we know at this stage what they might be –

here he stakes his claim as a dogmatist – and bases it on emotion – his emotional struggle –

and does he think that we should regard his story of dealing with his ‘great peril’ – as heroic?

 

[8] (1) There are many examples of men who have suffered persecution even to death for the sake of their riches, and of men who in pursuit of wealth have exposed themselves to so many dangers, that they have paid away their life as a penalty for their folly. (2) Examples are no less numerous of men, who have endured the utmost wretchedness for the sake of gaining or preserving their reputation. (3) Lastly, are innumerable cases of men, who have hastened their death through over-indulgence in sensual pleasure.

we are all – always exposed to dangers –

but again – the cause of any death is not a straightforward matter – anyone’s death requires investigation

a person may well have pursued wealth – but under investigation it is determined that that person died of a genetic disorder – an accident – or a communicable disease

and people do die of old age – regardless of their beliefs – or their behaviors 

and while it may be the case that someone has endured wretchedness for the sake of their reputation – there will be examples of those who have thrived by maintaining their reputation

from time to time you hear of examples of individuals who it is claimed have hastened death through over-indulgence in sensual pleasure

to substantiate such a claim – the matter needs to be investigated

and any explanation of death is always open to question

many would say that Elvis Presley’s death was caused by over-indulgence of sensual pleasure

however – it has been pointed out that he died two days after his mother’s death at the same age – from the same cardiac disease –

so – it is arguable whether his over-indulgence had anything to do with his death

and of course – there are cases of people who have lived a life of over-indulgence and lived to a ripe old age

we don’t get any substantive argument here from Spinoza – he seems just to be prejudiced against the pursuit of wealth – reputation – and sensual pleasure –

I can understand that these pursuits are not to everyone’s taste – but they shouldn’t be summarily written off as of no value –

furthermore – we must recognize that human beings pursue many and varied approaches to the question – ‘what is a good or worthwhile life?’

and the further point is – no-one is locked in to any one view of how best to live

people do change their perspectives throughout their lives

 

[9] (1) All these evils seem to have arisen from the fact, that happiness or unhappiness is made wholly dependent on the quality of the object which we love. (2) When a thing is not loved, no quarrels will arise concerning it--no sadness will be felt if it perishes--no envy if it is possessed by another--no fear, no hatred, in short no disturbances of the mind. (3) All these arise from the love of what is perishable, such as the objects already mentioned.

‘all these evils’ – wealth – fame – and sensual pleasure?

referring to these as ‘evils’ – is quite a step up from ‘ordinary objects of desire’ – and from – ‘I could see the benefits which are acquired through fame and riches’ – (apparently no benefit for Spinoza in sensual pleasure)

the key thing here is – we have no account of –  no analysis of the concept of evil –

logically speaking it just another of Spinoza’s conceptual floaters

the quality of the thing loved – is not independent of how we perceive it – we determine what we perceive – and any determination is uncertain – 

happiness too – is not a fixed state –

just how we understand and define happiness will change in different circumstances

and it is not clear from the above – just exactly what Spinoza means by love

i.e. – is love just desire – or is it to value?

when a thing is not loved?

shall we say here when a thing is not desired or valued?

is it always the case that no quarrels will result concerning it?

I may not desire or value a thing – but dispute with another over its possession – on the grounds of just entitlement as happens in courts of law

as to sadness – if it perishes –

I may not love a species of animal – but feel sadness if it becomes extinct

no envy if possessed by another?

I may not love an artwork – but envy the person who has the means to purchase it

no fear and no hatred of what I don’t – love – i.e. – desire or value?

I may not love another country – but fear it – fear it as it prepares for war

and as for not hating what one does not love –

if I hate something – I wish to see the end if it – its destruction

but can I not love something and wish for its destruction?

i.e. – I don’t love nuclear weapons – but I wish for their destruction

‘no disturbances of the mind’ – for what you do not love?

this suggests – if you don’t love something – you have no reason to consider it – to think about

for a mind that is passive – ‘not disturbed’ – is a mind that is not thinking –

you do not have to love something to think about it –

to think is to critically evaluate

if you are rational – you will critically evaluate any proposal put to you –

whether or not you love what is being proposed

‘All these arise from the love of what is perishable’?

if we are here dealing with human experience – and not some fantasy – what is not perishable?

we have no definitions of key the key terms – ‘evil’ – ‘love’ – and ‘hate’ – from Spinoza – and as a result we are really left up in the air – and his argument comes across as simplistic and naïve –

furthermore – as yet – there is no positive account from Spinoza – all we have so far is what he is against – and his arguments here – are a mishmash of prejudice and rhetoric

 

[10] (1) But love towards a thing eternal and infinite feeds the mind wholly with joy, and is itself unmingled with any sadness, wherefore it is greatly to be desired and sought for with all our strength. (2) Yet it was not at random that I used the words, "If I could go to the root of the matter," for, though what I have urged was perfectly clear to my mind, I could not forthwith lay aside all love of riches, sensual enjoyment, and fame

‘love towards a thing eternal and infinite’ –

we come back to the question of a definition of love –

what is it to love?

in the absence of a definition from Spinoza – I will say we love that which we value

and as for value – what is it to value something or someone?

we value things that give us pleasure – and so too with people – but with people there is a moral dimension

to love someone – I will suggest – is to want the best for them – which is to say – their happiness –

a ‘thing’ eternal and infinite – is not a person –

so – if I love a thing eternal and infinite – it is to say that that thing gives me pleasure?

I suppose anyone can get pleasure from anything – and if so – then one may get pleasure from contemplating a thing infinite and eternal –

however – contemplation of the infinite and eternal – may well be a source of despair or even horror for some – no pleasure at all

also – one may regard or contemplate the thing infinite and eternal – and have no emotional response at all – see it simply as just another explanation – of the reality –

just one among the many

‘for, though what I have urged was perfectly clear to my mind, I could not forthwith lay aside all love of riches, sensual enjoyment, and fame’

here Spinoza makes clear that just because something is ‘perfectly clear’ in the mind – it does not follow that one will abandon the ordinary objects of desire –

that is to say – clarity of mind – does not necessarily translate into a change of behaviour

even with this ‘clarity of mind’ – we are we are still left with the question of what perspective to adopt and what practice to proceed with

the matter is left uncertain

 

II. ON THE TRUE AND SUPREME GOOD

 

11] (1) One thing was evident, namely, that while my mind was employed with these thoughts it turned away from its former objects of desire, and seriously considered the search for a new principle; this state of things was a great comfort to me, for I perceived that the evils were not such as to resist all remedies. (11:2) Although these intervals were at first rare, and of very short duration, yet afterwards, as the true good became more and more discernible to me, they became more frequent and more lasting; especially after I had recognized that the acquisition of wealth, sensual pleasure, or fame, is only a hindrance, so long as they are sought as ends not as means; if they be sought as means, they will be under restraint, and, far from being hindrances, will further not a little the end for which they are sought, as I will show in due time.

Spinoza’s ‘evils’ – formerly known as ‘the ordinary objects of desire’ – it appears –

are only evils – if they are sought as ends and not as means –

so – whether these things (wealth – fame and sensual pleasure) – are good or evil depends on how they are perceived –

one result of this is that ‘evil’ – and presumably ‘good’ also – are thus rendered – at base – uncertain concepts –

he says – if they are sought as means – ‘they will be under restraint’ –

this is really only to say – that seeking wealth or fame or sensual pleasure – will have some definition – some direction – some goal –

and we can ask – how else could it be?

and surely the same will be true of any proposed ‘end’?

without some ‘restraint’ – some logical restraint – how could any proposed ‘end’ be defined – take shape – how could it be – an end?

and what this amounts to – is that Spinoza’s distinction of means and ends – as he has drawn it here – collapses –

for to be functional both ‘ends’ and ‘means’ – must have the ‘restraint’ of definition

‘restraint’ does not distinguish means and ends –

and so – this argument regarding his so called ‘evils’ – fails – it is neither here nor there –

one gets the impression Spinoza is struggling on this matter – on the one hand he wants a knock blow – but on the other hand – he wants to find a way of integrating these ‘ordinary objects of desire’ / ‘evils’ – into his alternative – an alternative we are yet to see developed

 

[12] (1) I will here only briefly state what I mean by true good, and also what is the nature of the highest good. (2) In order that this may be rightly understood, we must bear in mind that the terms good and evil are only applied relatively, so that the same thing may be called both good and bad according to the relations in view, in the same way as it may be called perfect or imperfect. (3) Nothing regarded in its own nature can be called perfect or imperfect; especially when we are aware that all things which come to pass, come to pass according to the eternal order and fixed laws of nature.

the ‘true good’ and the ‘highest good’?

Spinoza – then moves to say that the terms ‘good’ and ‘evil’ – are relative

so – are ‘true good’ and ‘highest good’ – to be regarded relatively?

one would think that ‘true’ and ‘highest’ – are not relative terms

‘nothing in its own nature’ – can be regarded as perfect or imperfect –

so presumably – ‘perfect’ and ‘imperfect’ are broadly speaking – matters of perception?

but if all things come to pass – ‘according to the eternal order and fixed laws of nature’ – 

would that not mean – all things are perfect?

anyway – as to the eternal and fixed laws of nature – how are these established?

surely any ‘law’ – is at base a proposition – a theory – and hypothesis –

and as such – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

and furthermore – our reality – our experience of reality is temporal – not eternal

we shall see where Spinoza goes with all of this

 

[13] (1) However, human weakness cannot attain to this order in its own thoughts, but meanwhile man conceives a human character much more stable than his own, and sees that there is no reason why he should not himself acquire such a character. (2) Thus he is led to seek for means which will bring him to this pitch of perfection, and calls everything which will serve as such means a true good. (13:3) The chief good is that he should arrive, together with other individuals if possible, at the possession of the aforesaid character. (4) What that character is we shall show in due time, namely, that it is the knowledge of the union existing being the mind and the whole of nature.

anyone can conceive or imagine a better self – a character ‘much more stable than his own’ –

yes – that is true – but there may be good reasons for why one decides he should not acquire such a character –

I might conceive an ideal self – but think on reflection – it is not a realistic conception

one may think – that a stable character – is just uninteresting – is boring – and that a ‘less stable character’ is one that is more open to the possibilities of experience 

‘the pitch of perfection’ – strikes me as fantasy –

human beings deal in uncertainty – imperfection –

to my mind – to suggest that the goal is perfection – is a denial of human nature – 

and to say that a true good is that which serves such a goal – is to say that any such true good is of no value to human beings –

if the notion of ‘true good’ is to make any sense – it must be firmly rooted in human experience – and not at the service of some ethical delusion

as to the character – Spinoza says we should arrive at –

‘namely the knowledge of the union of existing being the mind and the whole of nature’ –

one could put such a proposal – such a proposition – and accept it –

that is one could have this ‘knowledge’ – and yes it would affect one’s character – as any knowledge does – but does anyone think it would therefore result in a wholesale change of a person’s character?

I guess it is possible – but is strikes me as unlikely

I can see that it is conceivable that other individuals could have the same idea – but I can’t see that that in itself is a good thing

if we are to live rationally – we should be open to all and any ideas – knowledge – regarding our nature and activities

it might be comforting in a sense to find people who it seems have the same outlook – but without the exchange of different ideas and perspectives – there is no intellectual vitality – there is no growth of knowledge –

and in such a state human beings retreat into the cave of ignorance

 

[14] (1) This, then, is the end for which I strive, to attain to such a character myself, and to endeavor that many should attain to it with me. (2) In other words, it is part of my happiness to lend a helping hand, that many others may understand even as I do, so that their understanding and desire may entirely agree with my own. (3) In order to bring this about, it is necessary to understand as much of nature as will enable us to attain to the aforesaid character, and also to form a social order such as is most conducive to the attainment of this character by the greatest number with the least difficulty and danger.

‘I strive to attain such a character’?

so far all we have on such a character is – ‘the knowledge of the union existing being the mind and the whole of nature’

if this ‘knowledge’ – is all there is to ‘character’ – then character is just the affirmation of a particular idea – a particular metaphysic –

and do we have to ‘strive’ for this knowledge?

well – we have to think about it and make decisions – but ‘striving’ here suggests more than adopting a particular philosophic perspective –

however – so far from Spinoza – we have no real clue about what this ‘striving’ involves – and hence no real account of character or the changing of character –

all we have is ‘the knowledge of the union of existing being and the whole of nature’

and when you are down on the ground – in amongst the choices and conflicts of people in everyday life – character – what it is – and how it can be changed – is a much more complex matter than simple adopting a particular philosophical ideal

I think it is fair enough to let others know what you think – and why – if they want to know –

but the idea that you should be pushing your own perspective – with the hope that others will see the world as you do – is egoistic and pretentious

if you deal with others rationally – you will see that your own point of view is open to question –

and further you will be open to different perspectives – and be prepared to put them to question

the best you can do for another – is not get them to ‘entirely agree’ with you – but rather help them to critically evaluate your proposals – and help them to critically evaluate their own

in a world where everyone would ‘entirely agree’ with everyone else – the totalitarian dream – all you have is an end of the pursuit of knowledge – and the dawn of complete ignorance

such a reality is not going to occur –

fortunately – human beings are much more diverse in their thinking and their capacities to critically evaluate than Spinoza understands

it seems all he wants is for everyone to think like he does –

and on that – I would say – he is not a lone wolf

however – those who operate with such a view – live trapped in a small world – and are of little real value to anyone else

real character or rational character – embraces human diversity in all its forms –

such a character is genuinely open and understands and appreciates that it is in the uncertainties of our personal and social realities – that we have the ground and possibilities of knowledge and creativity

 

[15] (1) We must seek the assistance of Moral Philosophy and the Theory of Education; further, as health is no insignificant means for attaining our end, we must also include the whole science of Medicine, and, as many difficult things are by contrivance rendered easy, and we can in this way gain much time and convenience, the science of Mechanics must in no way be despised.

‘we must seek the assistance of moral philosophy …’

I take it that by ‘moral philosophy’ Spinoza means ethical theories and perhaps psychological theories –

and yes – any such theory proposed is worthy of consideration –

for any such theory may prove to be useful to us

however – it is not as if any such theory is just a commodity – that we simply accept and take delivery of –

the point is – no proposal / knowledge – is certain –

any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt and is – logically speaking –

uncertain –

we can operate with a particular ‘moral philosophy’ – if it speaks to our concerns –

while at the same time keeping an open mind – and being prepared to critically evaluate it

people do change their moral and psychological perspectives –

and if they do this in a rational manner – it will be the result of critical reflection

as to the basis of critical reflection – it is simply doubt

and any doubt – of course – is open to question

we never leave uncertainty – but we can and do operate in and with uncertainty in a rational manner

and – different theories and perspectives on education is all to the good –

but again – 

as experience shows such theories are open to question – and it is a good thing that they are – for as a result we have developed diverse and interesting education systems

we are all benefited by the continual advancements of the science of medicine –

and medicine as with the other sciences – advances through the critical evaluation of its data and theories

mechanics or physics – likewise is a critical study – and while its theories are not certain – they have been of enormous benefit in enriching our critical understanding of the physical world –

and they have delivered an amazing array of technological results

however – whether these technological results – that have come as a result of the physical sciences – are a benefit to us or not – is always an open question

 

16] (1) But before all things, a means must be devised for improving the understanding and purifying it, as far as may be at the outset, so that it may apprehend things without error, and in the best possible way. (2) Thus it is apparent to everyone that I wish to direct all science to one end and aim, so that we may attain to the supreme human perfection which we have named; and, therefore, whatsoever in the sciences does not serve to promote our object will have to be rejected as useless. (3) To sum up the matter in a word, all our actions and thoughts must be directed to this one end.

a means to improve the understanding and purifying it –

rational engagement with reality is not a matter of purification –

no proposal / proposition – is ‘impure’ –

if our understanding is rational and logical – any proposal / proposition entertained will be critically evaluated –

it is through question – and doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty that our understanding is improved –

as to error – 

there is no error in propositional activity –

any proposal put – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

and this aim of ‘human perfection’ –

if by ‘human perfection’ one means certainty – then there is no human perfection

for human beings – if they understand themselves rationally – see that all their ideas and actions are uncertain

I don’t say ‘imperfect’ – because ‘imperfect’ implies the possibility of perfection –

and ‘perfection’ – is a delusion of bad logic – and a refuge of the ignorant

if you reject ‘whatever in the sciences does not serve to promote our object’ (human perfection) – then you reject the sciences – you reject knowledge –

for the sciences are critical activities dealing with uncertainties

our thoughts and actions are never directed to one end –

human beings deal many and diverse ‘ends’

and the ‘ends’ that we adopt – like any proposal / proposition – are open to question – are uncertain

 

III. CERTAIN RULES OF LIFE

 

[17] (1) Yet, as it is necessary that while we are endeavoring to attain our purpose, and bring the understanding into the right path we should carry on our life, we are compelled first of all to lay down certain rules of life as provisionally good, to wit the following:--

I. (2) To speak in a manner intelligible to the multitude, and to comply with every general custom that does not hinder the attainment of our purpose. (3) For we can gain from the multitude no small advantages, provided that we strive to accommodate ourselves to its understanding as far as possible: moreover, we shall in this way gain a friendly audience for the reception of the truth.

II. (17:4) To indulge ourselves with pleasures only in so far as they are necessary for preserving health.

III. (5) Lastly, to endeavor to obtain only sufficient money or other commodities to enable us to preserve our life and health, and to follow such general customs as are consistent with our purpose.

there is no ‘right path’ – only different paths – and there no ‘rules of life’ –

how we live – and any practice we adopt in our living – is always a matter open to

question – and – any proposed ‘rule’ – likewise – is open to doubt – and uncertain

as to (1) – ‘speak in a manner intelligible to the multitude’? –

this is suggestive of elitism and paternalism

‘For we can gain from the multitude no small advantages, provided that we strive to accommodate ourselves to its understanding as far as possible’

and this – condescending

granted – communication with others – of whatever status or background – can be challenging – the message though is simple – a rational life is an open and critical life 

and as for gaining ‘a friendly audience for the reception of the truth’ –

a rational audience will not take kindly to authoritarianism and dogmatism – or to

the edicts of pretentious people who cannot see past their own ignorance –

any so called ‘truth’ can only be a proposal – which will be accepted – rejected – or

left undecided

and any truth decision on any proposal – will be open to question – open to doubt and uncertain –

and you don’t need to be a philosophic genius to get the point

(2) ‘To indulge ourselves with pleasures only in so far as they are necessary for

preserving health.’ 

nice idea – the fact remains – no one can say with any certainty just what ‘preserving health’ amounts to – there will be many and varied theories –

and has anyone figured out precisely the role of pleasure in health?

(3) yes –regardless of our ideals – we live in a material world – and need to take care of material matters

and yes – one needs to protect oneself – in any culture – but at the same time have a critical eye – as to what is going on –

out and out conformity – has its risks – and is not rational

 

IV. ON THE FOUR MODES OF PERCEPTION

 

[18] (1) Having laid down these preliminary rules, I will betake myself to the first and most important task, namely, the amendment of the understanding, and the rendering it capable of understanding things in the manner necessary for attaining our end. (2) In order to bring this about, the natural order demands that I should here recapitulate all the modes of perception, which I have hitherto employed for affirming or denying anything with certainty, so that I may choose the best, and at the same time begin to know my own powers and the nature which I wish to perfect.

 ‘I should here recapitulate all the modes of perception, which I have hitherto employed for affirming or denying anything with certainty, so that I may choose the best’

if there are these ‘modes of perception’ – that result in certainty – how can anyone be the best?

you would think that if you hold with certainty – then certainty of any mode – is the best

and if one or some modes are better than the rest – does this not mean that certainty is less than certain –

i.e. – that if there are options here – then does not uncertainty underpin certainty?

‘so that I may choose the best, and at the same time begin to know my own powers and the nature which I wish to perfect’

‘choosing the best’ – will be an exercise in uncertainty

as to ‘perfecting your nature’ –

regardless of whatever you do in such an endeavor – how would you ever know that you have reached perfection?

 

[19] (1) Reflection shows that all modes of perception or knowledge may be reduced to four: --

I. (2) Perception arising from hearsay or from some sign which everyone may name as he please.

II. (3) Perception arising from mere experience--that is, from experience not yet classified by the intellect, and only so called because the given event has happened to take place, and we have no contradictory fact to set against it, so that it therefore remains unassailed in our minds.

III. Perception arising when the essence of one thing is inferred from another thing, but not adequately; this comes when from some effect we gather its cause, or when it is inferred from some general proposition that some property is always present.

IV. (5) Lastly, there is the perception arising when a thing is perceived solely through its essence, or through the knowledge of its proximate cause.

‘modes of perception or knowledge’ – 

all knowledge is propositional –

a proposition is proposal – and logically speaking any proposal is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

as to (1) – ‘Perception arising from hearsay or from some sign which everyone may name as he please’ –

a sign is a proposal – and open to question – or as Spinoza puts it – ‘which everyone can name as he please’ – and as with any proposal – open to question

(2) ‘experience not yet classified by the intellect’ – with no ‘contradictory fact to set against it’

any event that takes place – before ‘classification of the intellect’ – is epistemologically unknown –

we make known through proposal – through description –

and any description proposed – is open to question – open to doubt – and therefore uncertain

(3) when the essence of one thing is inferred from the essence of another – when from some effect we gather its cause

‘essence’ – regardless of whatever it is supposed to be – is a proposal – and one that is open to question

inference of any form – that is of any description – is a proposal – and is uncertain

any causal analysis is propositional – is a proposal – open to question – and open to doubt

(4) knowledge from essence

it is not clear what essence is here – but any proposal of essence – as with any other proposal / proposition – is open to question

and again – any causal analysis – proximate or otherwise – and interesting – or useful as it might be – is nevertheless logically speaking uncertain

 

[20] (1) All these kinds of perception I will illustrate by examples. (2) By hearsay I know the day of my birth, my parentage, and other matters about which I have never felt any doubt. (3) By mere experience I know that I shall die, for this I can affirm from having seen that others like myself have died, though all did not live for the same period, or die by the same disease. (4) I know by mere experience that oil has the property of feeding fire, and water of extinguishing it. (5) In the same way I know that a dog is a barking animal, man a rational animal, and in fact nearly all the practical knowledge of life.

and all this ‘practical knowledge of life – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

birth and parentage – you may not have doubted – but these ‘facts’ are open to question –

i.e. – your day of birth may have been recorded mistakenly – and there are those who discover their ‘parents’ are not their biological parents

any contingent ‘fact’ – is open to question

it is conceivable that science could enable people to continue living and not die

there may be physical circumstances where oil does not feed fire – and water does not extinguish fire

a dog – a barking animal?

a dog might be bred that does not bark

and as to man being a rational animal –

if you go with this proposal – you are left with the question – what is it to be rational?

 

[21] (1) We deduce one thing from another as follows: when we clearly perceive that we feel a certain body and no other, we thence clearly infer that the mind is united to the body, and that their union is the cause of the given sensation; but we cannot thence absolutely understand the nature of the sensation and the union. (2) Or, after I have become acquainted with the nature of vision, and know that it has the property of making one and the same thing appear smaller when far off than when near, I can infer that the sun is larger than it appears, and can draw other conclusions of the same kind.

‘we deduce one thing from another’ –

deduction is a propositional game –

propositional activity has two modes – the critical mode and the game mode

in critical propositional activity we question and doubt and explore propositional activity

propositional games are rule governed propositional activities

in deduction the rule is that the conclusion is contained in the premise –

if you play this propositional game – you play according to the rule –

if you don’t follow the rule – you don’t play the game – you don’t deduce

the conclusion of Spinoza’s deduction here – that the mind is united to the body –

is already contained in what effectively is his first premise – the ‘sensation’ of union

his deduction explicates this sensation – and his conclusion – restates it

you can play the deduction game – but all we really have here is the proposal that the mind is united to the body – and as with any proposal – it is fair enough

but such a proposal is just a starting point for critical analysis – as Spinoza realizes here – ‘but we cannot thence absolutely understand the nature of the sensation and the union’

and the history of the philosophy of mind lays bare the questions doubts and uncertainties of the relation of mind and body

‘after I have become acquainted with the nature of vision’ –

this ‘becoming acquainted’ – only occurs because we question and doubt veridical perception – and become ‘acquainted’ with its uncertainties

and so ‘the nature of vision’ – as with the ’nature’ of anything – is a critical matter

 

 [22] (1) Lastly, a thing may be perceived solely through its essence; when, from the fact of knowing something, I know what it is to know that thing, or when, from knowing the essence of the mind, I know that it is united to the body. (2) By the same kind of knowledge we know that two and three make five, or that two lines each parallel to a third, are parallel to one another, &c. (3) The things which I have been able to know by this kind of knowledge are as yet very few.

a thing perceived through its essence

we have no formal definition of ‘essence’ here – and so the question – what is this ‘essence’?

Spinoza gives examples of essential knowledge –

‘from the fact that I know something I know what it is to know that that thing’

to know anything – is to know that you know

knowing that you know does not distinguish this so called ‘knowledge of essence’ – from any other form of knowledge 

perhaps – on this definition – all knowledge of something – is knowledge of essence?

the epistemological reality is that if you put a proposal – of any kind – you know that you put the proposal

and the proposal – if it is dealt with rationally – is critically evaluated

‘or when, from knowing the essence of the mind, I know that it is united to the body’

again – ‘the essence of the mind’ – what is that?

if this ‘essence of the mind’ – is not defined – how can I be said to know it?

and perhaps this ‘essence of the mind’ – is a cover for not-knowing

and as for this essential knowledge that the mind and body are united –

first up – this proposal presumes that we are talking here about two things – mind and body

many have argued that there is only one – the idealists – mind – materialists – body / brain

so – if this ‘unity argument’ of Spinoza’s – is an example of essential knowledge –

then ‘essential knowledge’ – is little more than a common proposal – before any critical analysis

‘By the same kind of knowledge we know that two and three make five, or that two lines each parallel to a third, are parallel to one another, &c.’

here we have examples of the game mode of propositional action

mathematics and geometry are propositional games – which is to say – they are rule governed propositional activities

2 + 3 = 5 – is a rule – and two lines parallel are parallel to a third – is a rule –

if you do mathematics and geometry – you play according to the rules of mathematics – and the rules of geometry

if you don’t play according the rules – you do not do mathematics or geometry

now it is the case that any rule can be put to question – and in effect this is what happens in meta-mathematics – and meta-geometry – but the critical examination of these rules – is not mathematics per se – is not geometry per se –

critical activity – is a different mode of propositional activity – to game playing – to

the game mode of propositional action

human beings have developed propositional games – and I would say the reason is that they have prove to be very useful –

as mathematics and geometry clearly show

we operate with two modes of propositional action – we critically evaluate proposals / propositions – and we make propositional games 

 

[23] (1) In order that the whole matter may be put in a clearer light, I will make use of a single illustration as follows. (2) Three numbers are given--it is required to find a fourth, which shall be to the third as the second is to the first. (23:3) Tradesmen will at once tell us that they know what is required to find the fourth number, for they have not yet forgotten the rule which was given to them arbitrarily without proof by their masters; others construct a universal axiom from their experience with simple numbers, where the fourth number is self-evident, as in the case of 2, 4, 3, 6; here it is evident that if the second number be multiplied by the third, and the product divided by the first, the quotient is 6; when they see that by this process the number is produced which they knew beforehand to be the proportional, they infer that the process always holds good for finding a fourth number proportional.

Spinoza here gives a perfect example of the logic and utility of the rule-governed propositional game

three numbers are given – and the task is to find the fourth 

and in this propositional game the rule here is that the fourth shall be to the third as the second is to the first

Spinoza notes that tradesmen will know how to do this for they know the rule

the rule can be converted into an axiom where the fourth number is self-evident

as with 2, 4, 3, 6 – and here it is evident that if the second number is multiplied by the third – and the product divided by the first – the quotient is 6

this process demonstrates the rule for finding a fourth number proportional

 

[24] (1) Mathematicians, however, know by the proof of the nineteenth proposition of the seventh book of Euclid, what numbers are proportionals, namely, from the nature and property of proportion it follows that the product of the first and fourth will be equal to the product of the second and third: still they do not see the adequate proportionality of the given numbers, or, if they do see it, they see it not by virtue of Euclid's proposition, but intuitively, without going through any process.

the proof of the nineteenth proposition of Euclid’s seventh book – as with any so called ‘proof’ is a deductive argument – that is a rule-governed propositional language game

the key point here is – that proportionality just is a rule governed propositional game

and if mathematicians do see adequate proportionality of the given numbers – it is not because of some so called ‘intuition’ – it is rather because they have mastered the concept of the proportionality game – and can therefore see where it might be applied

all knowledge is propositional – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

those who don’t understand this cling to the false notion of certain knowledge –and the flag bearer of this delusion is so called intuitive knowledge

yes – we ‘intuit’ – which can only mean we come up with – we put – proposals –

proposals that have not yet been put to question – put to doubt – proposals that have not been critically evaluated

any proposal / proposition is valid – but there are no proposals / propositions that have the mark of ‘certainty’ –

any claim of intuited certainty is just the mark of pretentious and dogmatic ignorance

 

V.  ON THE BEST MODE OF PERCEPTION

 

[25] (1) In order that from these modes of perception the best may be selected, it is well that we should briefly enumerate the means necessary for attaining our end.

I. To have an exact knowledge of our nature which we desire to perfect, and to know as much as is needful of nature in general.

II. To collect in this way the differences, the agreements, and the oppositions of things.

III. To learn thus exactly how far they can or cannot be modified.

IV. To compare this result with the nature and power of man. We shall thus discern the highest degree of perfection to which man is capable of attaining.

‘the best mode of perception’?

this is the question – what is the best kind of knowledge?

what we know is what we propose – but proposal is only the first step in the attainment of knowledge

a proposal / proposition is held rationally if it is critically examined

so – any proposal – put to question – put to doubt – its uncertainty explored – is the ‘best’ kind of knowledge – the best mode of perception 

as to (1) –

‘exact knowledge’?

if by ‘exact knowledge’ – is meant ‘final’ knowledge – then there is no exact knowledge – as any proposal / knowledge – is uncertain – is open to question

a more specific understanding / knowledge of a matter – might be regarded as ‘more exact’ – but that will only be relative to previous propositional formulations

our nature – is open to question – any proposal regarding our nature – will be open to question

there is no perfection in human affairs –

logically speaking – what is ‘needful’ – for human beings – is on-going critical propositional discovery  

and the rational means we have to facilitate any discovery – is question – doubt – and 

the exploration of uncertainty

(2) the differences – the agreements – and the opposition of things – will be discovered in any critical investigation

(3) the third point – how they can or cannot be modified – 

we modify our knowledge by critically examining it – and in so doing finding new propositional pathways to investigate 

(4) any comparison between the nature of things and the nature and power of man –

if rationally conducted will be a critical propositional comparison – and any proposed result will be open to question

 

[26] (1) We shall then be in a position to see which mode of perception we ought to choose. (2) As to the first mode, it is evident that from hearsay our knowledge must always be uncertain, and, moreover, can give us no insight into the essence of a thing, as is manifest in our illustration; now one can only arrive at knowledge of a thing through knowledge of its essence, as will hereafter appear. (3) We may, therefore clearly conclude that the certainty arising from hearsay cannot be scientific in its character. (4) For simple hearsay cannot affect anyone whose understanding does not, so to speak, meet it half way.

‘hearsay’ – or proposal – without critical examination – is uncertain –

and the reason is that any proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

it is uncertain – not because it gives ‘no insight into the essence of a thing’ –

any proposal of essence – is open to question – is uncertain 

‘essence’ – if it means anything – means – uncertainty

certainty arising from hearsay – or from any other means – is simply ignorance

‘simple hearsay’ – is proposal – and met halfway or not – from a logical point of view – is open to question

 

[27] (1) The second mode of perception cannot be said to give us the idea of the proportion of which we are in search. (2) Moreover its results are very uncertain and indefinite, for we shall never discover anything in natural phenomena by its means, except accidental properties, which are never clearly understood, unless the essence of the things in question be known first. (3) Wherefore this mode also must be rejected.

 the second mode of perception as defined by Spinoza is –

‘experience not yet classified by the intellect’ – with no ‘contradictory fact to set against it’

firstly – why a distinction between the first and second modes of perception?

Spinoza defines the first mode as ‘hearsay’ –

the background to any hearsay – will be experience – someone’s experience – which may or may not be ‘classified by the intellect’

and by the way – any ‘classification by the intellect’ – can only be a propositional description / explanation – that as with the proposed ‘hearsay’ – is open to question – and uncertain

with no ‘contradictory fact set against it’ – 

any proposal – is open to question – whether or not – a contradictory fact has been set against it –

and when a ‘contradictory fact’ is set against – a critical discussion can begin

knowledge / perception is proposal / proposition – uncertain and indefinite

and as to this distinction between essence and accident –

any so called ‘accidental property’ – is uncertain and any proposed ‘essence’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

if you reject propositional uncertainty – as Spinoza does here – you reject knowledge – you reject the growth of knowledge – and you fall back to the ignorance of pretense and dogmatism

 

[28] (1) Of the third mode of perception we may say in a manner that it gives us the idea of the thing sought, and that it us to draw conclusions without risk of error; yet it is not by itself sufficient to put us in possession of the perfection we aim at.

Spinoza defines his third mode of perception as –

when the essence of one thing is inferred from the essence of another – when from some effect we gather its cause

still – we have no explication of ‘essence’ – so we don’t know what it is – or if it is –

but we have inference – from one thing to another

as to inference – when we infer – in the most general sense – we relate 

now the making of a relation – is a propositional act –

inference is a propositional action – and as such – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

when from some effect we gather its cause?

as to this relation of cause and effect –

the cause and effect proposal has proved to be a most useful propositional device

however – there are any number of issues with the notion of cause and effect

i.e. – we can ask – does every event have a cause?

and is a causal statement anything more than a proposed explanation / description of an event?

and as to ‘effect’ – is an ‘effect’ – nothing more other than an observed event?

in any case – any proposed causal explanation – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

[29] (1) The fourth mode alone apprehends the adequate essence of a thing without danger of error. (2) This mode, therefore, must be the one which we chiefly employ. (3) How, then, should we avail ourselves of it so as to gain the fourth kind of knowledge with the least delay concerning things previously unknown? (4) I will proceed to explain.

‘the adequate essence of a thing’ –

Spinoza has defined ‘adequate’ or ‘essence’ – or ‘thing’

and so – this statement – as it stands at present – in Spinoza’s terms – is worthless

a ‘thing’ – is an unknown – unknown until it is proposed – that is until it is given a propositional description – and any such description – is open to question – is uncertain –

as to ‘adequate’ – this can only mean that the proposal put – in relation to the proposed thing – has a use – again – a use that will be open to question

essence – is what?

something like a comprehensive propositional description? –

a description that logically cannot be final

there is no error in propositional action –

any proposal put – is uncertain

there is only one ‘mode of perception’ – one mode of knowledge – and that is the critical mode

 

VI. ON THE INSTRUMENTS OF THE UNDERSTANDING, TRUE IDEAS

 

[30] (1) Now that we know what kind of knowledge is necessary for us, we must indicate the way and the method whereby we may gain the said knowledge concerning the things needful to be known. (2) In order to accomplish this, we must first take care not to commit ourselves to a search, going back to infinity--that is, in order to discover the best method of finding truth, there is no need of another method to discover such method; nor of a third method for discovering the second, and so on to infinity. (3) By such proceedings, we should never arrive at the knowledge of the truth, or, indeed, at any knowledge at all. (30:4) The matter stands on the same footing as the making of material tools, which might be argued about in a similar way. (5) For, in order to work iron, a hammer is needed, and the hammer cannot be forthcoming unless it has been made; but, in order to make it, there was need of another hammer and other tools, and so on to infinity. (6) We might thus vainly endeavor to prove that men have no power of working iron.

Spinoza’s argument here is that in the search for the method whereby we may gain knowledge – we must not commit to a search going back to infinity – for he says by such an approach we never reach knowledge

the ‘method’ – if you wish to call it that – which gives us knowledge – is the critical method –

that is to say – we subject our proposals / propositions – to question – to doubt – and in so doing explore their uncertainty

the more we explore propositional uncertainty – the greater our knowledge

critical analysis – from a logical point of view – has no end point –

however – when we act – as we do – and as we must – we act in and with uncertainty

as to the logical status of this ‘method’ – this critical method –  as with any other proposed method for attaining knowledge – it is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

[31] (1) But as men at first made use of the instruments supplied by nature to accomplish very easy pieces of workmanship, laboriously and imperfectly, and then, when these were finished, wrought other things more difficult with less labour and greater perfection; and so gradually mounted from the simplest operations to the making of tools, and from the making of tools to the making of more complex tools, and fresh feats of workmanship, till they arrived at making, complicated mechanisms which they now possess. (2) So, in like manner, the intellect, by its native strength, makes for itself intellectual instruments, whereby it acquires strength for performing other intellectual operations, and from these operations again fresh instruments, or the power of pushing its investigations further, and thus gradually proceeds till it reaches the summit of wisdom.

question – doubt – and the exploration of uncertainty – in short – the critical analysis of any proposal – will lead to propositional complexity

there is no summit of wisdom – wisdom rests in the recognition and the exploration of propositional uncertainty

 

[32] (1) That this is the path pursued by the understanding may be readily seen, when we understand the nature of the method for finding out the truth, and of the natural instruments so necessary complex instruments, and for the progress of investigation. I thus proceed with my demonstration.

a proposal / proposition is true – if assented to or affirmed – and any proposal of assent or affirmation – is open to question –

and a proposal is false – if denied or dissented from – and any proposal of dissent or denial – is open to question

the critical method is natural –

it is natural for human beings to question – to doubt – and to explore uncertainty

 

[33] (1) A true idea, (for we possess a true idea) is something different from its correlate (ideatum); thus a circle is different from the idea of a circle. (2) The idea of a circle is not something having a circumference and a center, as a circle has; nor is the idea of a body that body itself. (3) Now, as it is something different from its correlate, it is capable of being understood through itself; in other words, the idea, in so far as its actual essence (essentia formalis) is concerned, may be the subject of another subjective essence (essentia objectiva). (4) And, again, this second subjective essence

will, regarded in itself, be something real, capable of being understood; and so on, indefinitely.

‘idea’ is a description of a proposal – and ‘ideatum’ – a description of a proposal –

‘idea’ and ‘ideatum’ – two different descriptions – which can be put in relation to each other

and if put in relation to each other – the relation is put to question – put to doubt – its uncertainty explored

Spinoza says this ‘idea’ proposal ‘is capable of being understood through itself’ –

this is to say we understand the proposal ‘idea’ as it is proposed – as described

and ‘in so far as its actual essence is concerned, may be the subject of another subjective essence’ – is to say the proposal / idea – can – be further proposed and described –

we propose in relation to proposals

there is no logical end to this critical process –

however – the pragmatic imperative – puts a temporary stay critical analysis

we leave off critical analysis – when we have a description that suits our purpose –

however – any description and indeed – any purpose – will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

[34] (1) For instance, the man Peter is something real; the true idea of Peter is the reality of Peter represented subjectively, and is in itself something real, and quite distinct from the actual Peter. (2) Now, as this true idea of Peter is in itself something real, and has its own individual existence, it will also be capable of being understood--that is, of being the subject of another idea, which will contain by representation (objective) all that the idea of Peter contains actually (formaliter). (3) And, again, this idea of the idea of Peter has its own individuality, which may become the subject of yet another idea; and so on, indefinitely. (4) This everyone may make trial of for himself, by reflecting that he knows what Peter is, and also knows that he knows, and further knows that he knows that he knows, &c. (5) Hence it is plain that, in order to understand the actual Peter, it is not necessary first to understand the idea of Peter, and still less the idea of the idea of Peter. (6) This is the same as saying that, in order to know, there is no need to know that we know, much less to know that we know that we know. (7) This is no more necessary than to know the nature of a circle before knowing the nature of a triangle. (8) But, with these ideas, the contrary is the case: for, in order to know that I know, I must first know.

 ‘Peter’ – is a name – a place name for proposal –

in the absence of propositional description ‘Peter’ is an unknown

‘Peter’ can be described as ‘something real’ – ‘Peter’ can be described as an ‘idea’

yes – the proposal ‘Peter’ – described as an ‘idea’ is ‘real –

any proposal put is real

this idea ‘Peter’ – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain –

and as such can be further described –

logically speaking – proposal / description can go on indefinitely as the proposal of the ‘idea of Peter’ – is uncertain

there will be no ‘complete’ proposal / description of ‘Peter’ – as the proposal of the ‘idea of Peter’ – as with any proposal – is uncertain

we know that we know – and we know that our knowing is uncertain

the ‘idea of the idea’ – is just a proposal / description put in relation to of the subject proposal

the ‘actual Peter’ is a different proposal / description to the proposal ‘the idea of Peter’

however – we can drop these descriptions ‘idea of’ and ‘actual’ – and just refer to the name ‘Peter’ – and the proposals put in relation to the proposal / name ‘Peter’

we know that we propose –

knowing that we know is just the act of proposing

 

[35] (1) Hence it is clear that certainty is nothing else than the subjective essence of a thing: in other words, the mode in which we perceive an actual reality is certainty. (2) Further, it is also evident that, for the certitude of truth, no further sign is necessary beyond the possession of a true idea: for, as I have shown, it is not necessary to know that we know that we know. (3) Hence, again, it is clear that no one can know the nature of the highest certainty, unless he possesses an adequate idea, or the subjective essence of a thing: certainty is identical with such subjective essence.

the ‘subjective essence of a thing’ – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

the mode in which we perceive – is the propositional –

any proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

a ‘true idea’ – is a proposal that is assented to – is affirmed –

any proposal of affirmation or assent – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

truth is uncertain

‘the highest certainty’?

if the notion of certainty is to make any sense – then certainty is not a relative term – it would have to be absolute

so – Spinoza’s ‘highest certainty’ – would not be a certainty

by ‘adequate idea’ – Spinoza means an idea / proposal – that is beyond question – beyond doubt –

from a logical point of view – there is no such proposal / idea

certainty is identical to dogmatism – prejudice – and ignorance

 

VII. ON THE RIGHT METHOD OF KNOWING

 

[36] (1) Thus, as the truth needs no sign--it being to possess the subjective essence of things, or, in other words, the ideas of them, in order that all doubts may be removed--it follows that the true method does not consist in seeking for the signs of truth after the acquisition of the idea, but that the true method teaches us the order in which we should seek for truth itself, or the subjective essences of things, or ideas, for all these expressions are synonymous.

the sign of truth or should I say the sign of proposed truth – is assent or affirmation – in whatever form that takes

‘the subjective essence of things or ideas the ideas of them’ – are proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

a proposal / idea is put – it can then be assented to dissented from – or left undecided

which is to say the proposal / idea put has no truth value until it is considered and examined

 

[37] (1) Again, method must necessarily be concerned with reasoning or understanding--I mean, method is not identical with reasoning in the search for causes, still less is it the comprehension of the causes of things: it is the discernment of a true idea, by distinguishing it from other perceptions, and by investigating its nature, in order that we may so train our mind that it may, by a given standard, comprehend whatsoever is intelligible, by laying down certain rules as aids, and by avoiding useless mental exertion.

a proposal put – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

a critical response to a proposal – may well involve consideration of causes

a proposal that is affirmed – will be distinguished from any competing proposal – by the affirmation

however – any proposal of affirmation – like the subject proposal – is open to question – is uncertain

the rational ‘standard’ – is the critical method –

there are no ‘rules’ as such to the critical process – no short cuts –

the critical process is the activity of question – of doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty – and any such activity does involve mental exertion

 

[38] (1) Whence we may gather that method is nothing else than reflective knowledge, or the idea of an idea; and that as there can be no idea of an idea--unless an idea exists previously, --there can be no method without a pre-existent idea. (2) Therefore, that will be a good method which shows us how the mind should be directed, according to the standard of the given true idea.

we begin always with the proposal – the proposition –

but the ‘method’ we use to understand and evaluate the proposal / proposition is not reflective in Spinoza’s sense –

we do not have an idea of an idea etc.– that is a proposal of a proposal etc.–

this idea of the idea – proposal of the proposal – gets you nowhere – you never get beyond the original idea / proposal – all you in fact do is re-state it – and pretend that by re-statement you are expanding your understanding of it

we begin with the proposal / proposition – and critically evaluate it –

we put it to question – to doubt – and explore its uncertainty –

in response to this critical method – this critical investigation – other proposals can be put – can be entertained – can be critically evaluated –

‘the given true idea’ – in any context – is simply a proposal / proposition put –

put for critical examination

 

[39.1] (1) We thus easily understand how, in proportion as it acquires new ideas, the mind simultaneously acquires fresh instruments for pursuing its inquiries further. (2) For we may gather from what has been said, that a true idea must necessarily first of all exist in us as a natural instrument; and that when this idea is apprehended by the mind, it enables us to understand the difference existing between itself and all other perceptions. (3) In this, one part of the method consists

an idea – or so called ‘true idea’ – is not ‘apprehended by the mind’ – as if it was there before the mind –

an idea – whether affirmed or not – is made by the mind – is a proposal put by a propositional actor –

propositional actors – propose propositional reality

we are born into a propositional reality – a world of proposal put by propositional actors

we navigate this reality by critically examining it and by proposing in relation to it

we determine which propositional actions are useful to us through critical evaluation

those proposals that have utility will be affirmed – with the understanding that any proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

(39.2) Now it is clear that the mind apprehends itself better in proportion as it understands a greater number of natural objects; it follows, therefore, that this portion of the method will be more perfect in proportion as the mind attains to the comprehension of a greater number of objects, and that it will be absolutely perfect when the mind gains a knowledge of the absolutely perfect being, or becomes conscious thereof.

‘apprehending a greater number of objects’ – is not understanding

understanding comes with the critical process of question – of doubt – and the exploration of uncertainty –

understanding is not a matter of quantity but rather of critical activity –

there is no ‘absolutely perfect’ understanding –

all understanding – all knowledge – is open to question – is uncertain

this proposal of the ‘absolutely perfect being’ – is logically incoherent

there is no ‘absolute’ in propositional reality – for an ‘absolute’ – is a finality – beyond question – beyond doubt – and certain

and ‘perfection’ here – is a synonym for ‘absolute’

any proposed ‘being’ – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

Spinoza’s fantasy world – of ‘absolutes’ –‘perfections’ and ‘a perfect being’ – bears no relation to the reality we inhabit and the realities that we make

 

[40] (1) Again, the more things the mind knows, the better does it understand its own strength and the order of nature; by increased self-knowledge, it can direct itself more easily, and lay down rules for its own guidance; and, by increased knowledge of nature, it can more easily avoid what is useless. (2) And this is the sum total of method, as we have already stated.

again – knowledge – genuine knowledge and understanding is not a matter of quantity – of ‘the more things the mind knows’ –

knowing and understanding come as a result of the critical process of question – of doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty

and this is the case with ‘self-knowledge’ – our knowledge of ourselves – is no different to any other form of knowledge –

if we act rationally – we put our proposals regarding ourselves to question – to doubt – and we explore their uncertainty

the issue with nature – is not ‘increased knowledge’ – our knowledge of nature – of the world we live in – if it is rational – is critical knowledge

what is useful and what is useless is not anything that can be determined out of a living context – and in any living context it is critical thinking that will guide our decisions and actions

 

[41] (1) We may add that the idea in the world of thought is in the same case as its correlate in the world of reality. (2) If, therefore, there be anything in nature which is without connection with any other thing, and if we assign to it a subjective essence, which would in every way correspond to the objective reality, the subjective essence would have no connection, with any other ideas--in other words, we could not draw any conclusions with regard to it. (3) On the other hand, those things which are connected with others--as all things that exist in nature--will be understood by the mind, and their subjective essences will maintain the same mutual relations as their objective realities--that is to say, we shall infer from these ideas other ideas, which will in turn be connected with others, and thus our instruments for proceeding with our investigation will increase. (4) This is what we were endeavoring to prove.

the argument here is that our ideas correspond objectively to what is in the world –

and the proposal that in nature – everything is connected

and the further proposal that – our ideas are connected in the same way as ‘things in nature’ –

and so – any inference from idea to idea – will be objective – will be real in nature –

and that it is through inference – from ideas to ideas that we proceed

our reality is proposal – is proposed – outside of proposal is the unknown

there is no – non-propositional reality – that proposals correspond to or not

and so – if this idea / objective reality distinction of Spinoza’s is to have any meaning – it must be seen as a proposed relation between different proposals – the proposal of the idea – and the proposal of an objective reality

such a proposal – and proposed relation – as with any propositional action is valid –

and as with any proposal – or propositional construction – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

inference from idea to idea – is proposal put against proposal – and yes this is how we proceed – proposals are critically examined – and in response further proposals are put and critically evaluated

 

[42] (1) Further, from what has just been said--namely, that an idea must, in all respects, correspond to its correlate in the world of reality,--it is evident that, in order to reproduce in every respect the faithful image of nature, our mind must deduce all its ideas from the idea which represents the origin and source of the whole of nature, so that it may itself become the source of other ideas.

‘a faithful image of nature’ – is the propositional work of the empirical sciences –

and as the history of science shows – creating ‘a faithful image of nature’ is a critical endeavor –

as to the ‘origin and source’ of our proposals – that in itself – is a critical study

and any proposal regarding ‘the origin and source of the whole of the whole of nature’ – will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

[43] (1) It may, perhaps, provoke astonishment that, after having said that the good method is that which teaches us to direct our mind according to the standard of the given true idea, we should prove our point by reasoning, which would seem to indicate that it is not self-evident. (2) We may, therefore, be questioned as to the validity of our reasoning. (3) If our reasoning be sound, we must take as a starting-point a true idea. (4) Now, to be certain that our starting-point is really a true idea, we need proof. (5) This first course of reasoning must be supported by a second, the second by a third, and so on to infinity.

there is no given true idea – in Spinoza’s sense of ‘objective’ –

all proposals / propositions are subjective and objective – and once this is understood the subjective / objective distinction evaporates – and we are left with the proposal – with the proposition unadorned

one can of course propose and affirm an idea / proposal – and proceed in terms of it

no idea is self-evident – and idea / proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

reasoning here for Spinoza – is ‘proof’ – and proof is a deductive propositional game

and yes – you can support your ‘proof’ by a second proof – and then a third – ‘and so on to infinity’ –

all you are doing – is playing endless word-games –

any idea / proposal can be regarded as true – that is can be affirmed – and any proposal of affirmation – as with the subject proposal / proposition – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

[44] (1) To this I make answer that, if by some happy chance anyone had adopted this method in his investigations of nature--that is, if he had acquired new ideas in the proper order, according to the standard of the original true idea, he would never have doubted of the truth of his knowledge, inasmuch as truth, as we have shown, makes itself manifest, and all things would flow, as it were, spontaneously towards him. (44) But as this never, or rarely, happens, I have been forced so to arrange my proceedings, that we may acquire by reflection and forethought what we cannot acquire by chance, and that it may at the same time appear that, for proving the truth, and for valid reasoning, we need no other means than the truth and valid reasoning themselves: for by valid reasoning I have established valid reasoning, and, in like measure, I seek still to establish it.

‘new ideas in the proper order’?

we have no account from Spinoza as to what his ‘proper order’ is –

and as for ‘truth’ – truth does not make itself manifest –

what can ‘make itself manifest’ – possibly mean here?

a true idea / proposal – is one that is assented to – one that is affirmed –

and any proposal of assent or affirmation – as with the subject idea / proposal – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

‘and all things would flow, as it were, spontaneously towards him.’ – is mystical rubbish

‘for by valid reasoning I have established valid reasoning, and, in like measure, I seek still to establish it.’

it is not clear here what valid reasoning is for Spinoza – but I suspect he has in mind – deductive reasoning –

deduction is a propositional word-game –

which is to say – any conclusion deduced is already to found in the premises –

deduction – actually produces nothing –

what you end up with – in deduction – is what you began with – and what you began with is a proposal – and if dealt with rationally – the proposal is critically evaluated –put to question – put to doubt – its uncertainty explored

 

[45] (1) Moreover, this is the order of thinking adopted by men in their inward meditations. (2) The reasons for its rare employment in investigations of nature are to be found in current misconceptions, whereof we shall examine the causes hereafter in our philosophy. (3) Moreover, it demands, as we shall show, a keen and accurate discernment. (4) Lastly, it is hindered by the conditions of human life, which are, as we have already pointed out, extremely changeable. (5) There are also other obstacles, which we will not here inquire into.

‘the order of thinking’?

Spinoza describes this as that ‘adopted by men in their inward meditations’ – and one that ‘demands a keen and accurate discernment’ –

that’s all very well – but as it stands – this ‘order of thinking’ – could mean any kind of thinking –

at this point in his argument – Spinoza’s ‘order of thinking’ – is vague to the point of meaningless –

we shall see where he takes it

 

46] (1) If anyone asks why I have not at the starting-point set forth all the truths of nature in their due order, inasmuch as truth is self-evident, I reply by warning him not to reject as false any paradoxes he may find here, but to take the trouble to reflect on the chain of reasoning by which they are supported; he will then be no longer in doubt that we have attained to the truth. (2) This is why I have as above.

with due respect I would suggest that the reason Spinoza has not ‘at the starting-point set forth’ all the truths of nature – is because these so-called ‘truths’ are not self-evident

‘this chain of reasoning’ he refers to is a rule governed deductive propositional game where any conclusion is contained in the premise – where any ‘truths’ – are no more that proposals / propositions – that have not been critically examined

I think for Spinoza a self-evident truth – is just this – an unexamined proposition

 

[47] (1) If there yet remains some sceptic, who doubts of our primary truth, and of all deductions we make, taking such truth as our standard, he must either be arguing in bad faith, or we must confess that there are men in complete mental blindness either innate or due to misconceptions--that is, to some external influence. (2) Such persons are not conscious of themselves. (3) If they affirm or doubt anything, they know not

that they affirm or doubt: they say that they know nothing, and they say that they are ignorant of the very fact of their knowing nothing. (4) Even this they do not affirm

absolutely, they are afraid of confessing that they exist, so long as they know nothing; in fact, they ought to remain dumb, for fear of haply supposing which should smack of truth.

‘bad faith – ‘complete mental blindness either innate or due to misconceptions – due to some external influence’ –

this is not an argument against skepticism – it is a put down of it –

it represents a prejudice – a strong prejudice – against the sceptic and scepticism –

any proposed ‘truth’ or ‘standard’ – and any deductions from it – are proposals / propositions – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

to suggest that anyone who raise a question – rises a doubt – or considers the uncertainty of a proposed ‘truth’ – is not conscious of themselves – really demonstrates Spinoza’s bitterness to any alternative view to his own – and demonstrates his ignorance

of course – if you affirm or doubt – you know that you affirm or doubt –

‘they say that they are ignorant of the very fact of their knowing nothing’

anyone who claims that they know nothing – knows that that they nothing – and yes that is a contradiction –

as I see it – the argument of the sceptic is that our knowledge is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

I do confess that I exist – but just what my existing comes to – what it amounts to – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

surely it is not hard to understand that existence is uncertain?

 

[48] (1) Lastly, with such persons, one should not speak of sciences: for, in what relates to life and conduct, they are compelled by necessity to suppose that they exist, and seek their own advantage, and often affirm and deny, even with an oath. (2) If they deny, grant, or gainsay, they know not that they deny, grant, or gainsay, so that they ought to be regarded as automata, utterly devoid of intelligence.

yes – well here is the final put down –

no rational man could entertain the above statements –

and if this is all Spinoza’s ‘argument’ against scepticism comes to – then clearly it is no argument at all– it is simply ignorant and vicious prejudice –

and the sceptic – the rational sceptic – has nothing to fear from Spinoza

 

[49] (1) Let us now return to our proposition. (2) Up to the present, we have, first, defined the end to which we desire to direct all our thoughts; secondly, we have determined the mode of perception best adapted to aid us in attaining our perfection; thirdly, we have discovered the way which our mind should take, in order to make a good beginning--namely, that it should use every true idea as a standard in pursuing its inquiries according to fixed rules. (3) Now, in order that it may thus proceed, our method must furnish us, first, with a means of distinguishing a true idea from all other perceptions, and enabling the mind to avoid the latter; secondly, with rules for perceiving unknown things according to the standard of the true idea; thirdly, with an order which enables us to avoid useless labor. (4) When we became acquainted with this method, we saw that, fourthly, it would be perfect when we had attained to the idea of the absolutely perfect Being. (5) This is an observation which should be made at the outset, in order that we may arrive at the knowledge of such a being more quickly.

whether an idea / proposal is true or not – that is whether it is to be affirmed or not – is for all propositional actors – open to question –

and it must be realized that an idea / proposal – will – quite legitimately be assigned different truth values by different actors –

as to fixed rules – who fixes these rules?

and I should add – any ‘rule’ – will be open to question –

how we pursue our inquires – is open to question – which means in effect there are no fixed rules

a ‘means of distinguishing a true idea from all other perceptions’ – will always be open to question

as to perceiving or knowing unknown things –

any ‘thing’ – in the absence of proposal / description – is an unknown

in most cases we begin with how the thing is proposed to us – and from there move to critical evaluation

where a ‘thing’ – has no known propositional description – we must begin by proposing one – and take it from there

as to ‘useless labor’ – no critical evaluation is useless

‘it would be perfect when we had attained to the idea of the absolutely perfect Being’

there is no perfect being –

‘being’ – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

and we can ask – in general – why should any method of inquiry be tied to this proposal of a perfect being?

we can get along quite well with the baggage of a ‘perfect being’

 

VIII. FIRST PART OF THE METHOD – ON FICTITIOUS IDEAS

 

[50] (1) Let us then make a beginning with the first part of the method, which is, as we have said, to distinguish and separate the true idea from other perceptions, and to keep the mind from confusing with true ideas those which are false, fictitious, and doubtful. (2) I intend to dwell on this point at length, partly to keep a distinction so necessary before the reader's mind, and also because there are some who doubt of true ideas, through not having attended to the distinction between a true perception and all others. (3) Such persons are like men who, while they are awake, doubt not that they are awake, but afterwards in a dream, as often happens, thinking that they are surely awake, and then finding that they were in error, become doubtful even of being awake. (4) This state of mind arises through neglect of the distinction between sleeping and waking.

those ‘who doubt of true ideas, though not having attended to the distinction between a true perception and all others’

no perception is in itself true – all perceptions / proposals – are open to question – open to doubt and uncertain –

a true perception / proposal – is just a proposal that is affirmed – and affirmed by a propositional actor – for whatever reason – and any proposal of affirmation – like the subject proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘Such persons are like men who, while they are awake, doubt not that they are awake, but afterwards in a dream, as often happens, thinking that they are surely awake, and then finding that they were in error, become doubtful even of being awake. This state of mind arises through neglect of the distinction between sleeping and waking.’

any proposal – whether one is awake proposing or asleep and dreaming and proposing – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

from a logical point of view – the ‘distinction between sleeping and waking’ – is irrelevant

 

[51] (1) Meanwhile, I give warning that I shall not here give essence of every perception, and explain it through its proximate cause. (2) Such work lies in the province of philosophy. (3) I shall confine myself to what concerns method--that is, to the character of fictitious, false and doubtful perceptions, and the means of freeing ourselves therefrom. (4) Let us then first inquire into the nature of a fictitious idea.

any ‘explanation’ of ‘proximate cause’ – as with any explanation of anything is open to question

‘explanation’ is useful – but uncertain

as to ‘method’ – the rational method is the critical method

‘fictitious, false and doubtful perceptions’ –

any perception / proposal is valid –

a perception may be labelled ‘fictitious’ – relative to some theory of what is factual –

but these descriptions ‘fictitious’ and ‘factual’ – in any context – are open to question

no ‘perception’ / proposal / proposition – is – in itself – true or false

we propose truth value –

and we propose truth value in response to proposals / proposition that we entertain and that are put to us

a proposition – is true if affirmed – for whatever reason – false – if denied – for whatever reason

any reason we have for affirmation or denial – is open to question –

and any proposal of affirmation or denial – is likewise – open to doubt – and logically speaking – uncertain

‘doubtful perceptions’

any perception / proposal – is open to doubt

 

[52] (1) Every perception has for its object either a thing considered as existing, or solely the essence of a thing. (2) Now "fiction" is chiefly occupied with things considered as existing. (3) I will, therefore, consider these first--I mean cases where only the existence of an object is feigned, and the thing thus feigned is understood, or assumed to be understood. (4) For instance, I feign that Peter, whom I know to have gone home, is gone to see me, or something of that kind. (5) With what is such an idea concerned? (6) It is concerned with things possible, and not with things necessary or impossible.

 the ’object’ of a ‘perception’ – of a proposal / proposition – in the absence of description – is unknown

‘a thing considered as existing’ – or just ‘thing’ – is a place name for proposal for description –

that is to say – ‘thing’ functions as an identification of an unknown – an unknown that is to be the subject of proposal – of description

and this ‘essence’ of a thing – likewise is an identification of an unknown that is to be a subject or target of proposal – of description –

it should be pointed out here that what ‘exists’ – is just what is proposed –

and any proposal – that is any existent – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘I feign that Peter, whom I know to have gone home, is gone to see me, or something of that kind’

I may propose that Peter has gone home – this proposal – this ‘knowing’ – logically speaking – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain –

point being – that it is quite possible that Peter has not gone home – and therefore quite possible that he is coming to see me ‘or something of that kind’

I can stick with the proposal that he has gone home – while recognizing that it is uncertain – and there is nothing to stop me entertaining the proposal that he is coming to see me – while recognizing that such a proposal is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

Spinoza defines ‘fiction’ as concerned with things possible – and not with things necessary or impossible –

firstly – ‘things necessary’ –

if by ‘necessary’ here – is meant ‘certain’ – and ‘certain existence’ –

no proposal / proposition is certain – and ‘existence’ as that proposed – is uncertain

secondly – ‘impossible’ –

an ‘impossible thing’ – a thing that cannot exist – is a proposal that cannot be put –and a proposal that cannot be put – is a proposal that is not put

our reality – is what is proposed – our reality is what can be proposed

and as any proposal put is uncertain – any proposal is an expression of possibility

uncertainty and therefore possibility is the ground of our propositional life –

and further – it the ground of our freedom – our freedom to propose against the unknown – our freedom to describe the unknown – and our freedom to question – to doubt – and to explore the uncertainty of our propositional actions

 

[53] (1) I call a thing impossible when its existence would imply a contradiction; necessary, when its non-existence would imply a contradiction; possible, when neither its existence nor its non-existence imply a contradiction, but when the necessity or impossibility of its nature depends on causes unknown to us, while we feign that it exists. (2) If the necessity or impossibility of its existence depending on external causes were known to us, we could not form any fictitious hypotheses about it.

‘impossible’ –

an impossible thing – if proposed – if its existence is proposed – exists – and is therefore not impossible

a contradiction – may appear to be a genuine proposal – but it is a statement that proposes nothing – it is a non-proposal – it is a fake proposal

as to ‘necessary’ –

a thing exists if proposed – a thing does not exist if not proposed –

the absence of proposal does not imply a contradiction –

‘possible’ –

‘when the necessity or impossibility of its nature depends on causes unknown to us, while we feign that it exists.’

there is no propositional necessity – only propositional uncertainty –

and as for ‘impossibility’ – our reality is the reality of possibility

we don’t ‘feign’ – we propose –

and we propose in response to – in reaction to – the unknown

from a logical point of view – there are no ‘fictitious’ proposals / hypotheses

any proposal / hypothesis is real – is valid – and any proposal / hypothesis is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

[54] (1) Whence it follows that if there be a God, or omniscient Being, such a one cannot form fictitious hypotheses. (2) For, as regards ourselves, when I know that I exist, I cannot hypothesize that I exist or do not exist, any more than I can hypothesize an elephant that can go through the eye of a needle; nor when I know the nature of God, can I hypothesize that He does not exist.  The same thing must be said of the Chimaera, whereof the nature implies a contradiction. (4) From these considerations, it is plain, as I have already stated, that fiction cannot be concerned with eternal truths. 

if a ‘God or omniscient being’ is proposed – that proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

if I propose that I exist – the terms ’I’ and ‘exist’ – can be put to question – but to doubt – their uncertainty explored

i.e. –in Spinoza’s metaphysics – reality – is an expression of the eternal and infinite substance that is God – and this substance is undivided – is a unity –

if you accept this outlook – or some version of it – individuation becomes problematic – and you can ask does the proposal of ‘I’ as an individual – or the proposal of any individual thing make sense?

in what sense then can we say that ‘I’ exist?

could it be that in terms of such a metaphysic ‘I’ – do not exist?

‘nature’ is what is proposed – a contradiction is not a proposal –

‘eternal truths’ – I take it – are proposals that are put as being beyond question – beyond doubt and certain

such ‘proposals’ – are not proposals – are not propositions – they are ignorant prejudices that are an anathema to rationality –

our ‘truths’ – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

[55] (1) But before proceeding further, I must remark, in passing, that the difference between the essence of one thing and the essence of another thing is the same as that which exists between the reality or existence of one thing and the reality or existence of another; therefore, if we wished to conceive the existence, for example, of Adam, simply by means of existence in general, it would be the same as if, in order to conceive his existence, we went back to the nature of being, so as to define Adam as a being. (2) Thus, the more existence is conceived generally, the more is it conceived confusedly and the more easily can it be ascribed to a given object. Contrariwise, the more it is conceived particularly, the more is it understood clearly, and the less liable is it to be ascribed, through negligence of Nature's order, to anything save its proper object. (4) This is worthy of remark.

if the difference between the essence of one thing – and the essence of another – is the same as that which exists between the reality or existence or one thing and the reality or existence of another –

then essence and existence are the same – and if – so either essence is an unnecessary concept – if you have existence – or existence is unnecessary if your focus is essence

on the face of it this doubling up of essence and existence is conceptually unnecessary

or the thing in question is proposed in different ways for different reasons – for different uses – then there may be a role for both concepts – but then the thing in itself – comes off as an unknown

‘if we wish to conceive the existence (of Adam) in general it would be the same as if, in order to conceive his existence, we went back to the nature of being, so as to define Adam as a being’

the existence of Adam – in general – really doesn’t make sense – as Adam is a particular – not a ‘general’ –

and conceiving Adam in terms of the general – ‘the nature of being’ – really doesn’t get us to Adam

the point being – this general account of being is one thing – a conception of a particular existent – another matter altogether –

to conflate the two conceptions – the two proposals – compromises both – and leaves everything – including Adam – in a conceptual mess –

Adam exists if proposed – and the proposal ‘Adam’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

and further – ‘existence in general’ – is a dumb concept – for all you can really contrast it with is non-existence – and ‘non-existence’ – amounts to nothing –

so strictly speaking – there is nothing to be said regarding ‘existence in general’ –

and it seems Spinoza agrees with this

‘Thus, the more existence is conceived generally, the more is it conceived confusedly and the more easily can it be ascribed to a given object. Contrariwise, the more it is conceived particularly, the more is it understood clearly, and the less liable is it to be ascribed, through negligence of Nature's order, to anything save its proper object. (4) This is worthy of remark.’

 

[56] (1) We now proceed to consider those cases which are commonly called fictions, though we clearly understood that the thing is not as we imagine it. (2) For instance, I know that the earth is round, but nothing prevents my telling people that it is a hemisphere, and that it is like a half apple carved in relief on a dish; or, that the sun moves round the earth, and so on. (3) However, examination will show us that there is nothing here inconsistent with what has been said, provided we first admit that we may have made mistakes, and be now conscious of them; and, further, that we can hypothesize, or at least suppose, that others are under the same mistake as ourselves, or can, like us, fall under it. (4) We can, I repeat, thus hypothesize so long as we see no impossibility. (5) Thus, when I tell anyone that the earth is not round, &c., I merely recall the error which I perhaps made myself, or which I might have fallen into, and afterwards I hypothesize that the person to whom I tell it, is still, or may still fall under the same mistake. (6) This I say, I can feign so long as I do not perceive any impossibility or necessity; if I truly understood either one or the other I should not be able to feign, and I should be reduced to saying that I had made the attempt.

‘For instance, I know that the earth is round, but nothing prevents my telling people that it is a hemisphere, and that it is like a half apple carved in relief on a dish; or, that the sun moves round the earth, and so on.’

‘I know that the earth is round’ – is to say – I accept the proposal that the earth is round – which is to say I accept the view of modern science

and Spinoza is quite right – nothing prevents me from putting an alternative proposal

‘the earth is round’ proposal – and any alternative proposals – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain – as the history of the issue well demonstrates

‘However, examination will show us that there is nothing here inconsistent with what has been said, provided we first admit that we may have made mistakes, and be now conscious of them; and, further, that we can hypothesize, or at least suppose, that others are under the same mistake as ourselves, or can, like us, fall under it.’

logically speaking – there are no mistakes – only uncertainties

‘We can, I repeat, thus hypothesize so long as we see no impossibility’

the point is – we are free to propose – and any proposal put – is open to question

‘Thus, when I tell anyone that the earth is not round, &c., I merely recall the error which I perhaps made myself, or which I might have fallen into, and afterwards I hypothesize that the person to whom I tell it, is still, or may still fall under the same mistake’

I can propose that the earth is not round – 

there is no error in this –

however – my proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

and in this connection the arguments against my proposal – the arguments of modern science – are formidable

‘This I say, I can feign so long as I do not perceive any impossibility or necessity; if I truly understood either one or the other I should not be able to feign, and I should be reduced to saying that I had made the attempt.

this ‘truly understand’ –

we don’t reach an end point in understanding –

any proposal or propositional structure – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

if we are rational – we explore this uncertainty – and in so doing expand our critical knowing – recognizing that logically there is no end to this exploration 

why we come to affirm any proposal – and decide to proceed with it – is like the proposal itself – a matter open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

[57] (1) It remains for us to consider hypotheses made in problems, which sometimes involve impossibilities. (2) For instance, when we say--let us assume that this burning candle is not burning, or, let us assume that it burns in some imaginary space, or where there are no physical objects. (3) Such assumptions are freely made, though the last is clearly seen to be impossible. (4) But, though this be so, there is no fiction in the case. (5) For, in the first case, I have merely recalled to memory,  another candle not burning, or conceived the candle before me as without a flame, and then I understand as applying to the latter, leaving its flame out of the question, all that I think of the former. (6) In the second case, I have merely to abstract my thoughts from the objects surrounding the candle, for the mind to devote itself to the contemplation of the candle singly looked at in itself only; I can then draw the conclusion that the candle contains in itself no causes for its own destruction, so that if there were no physical objects the candle, and even the flame, would remain unchangeable, and so on. (7) Thus there is here no fiction, but, true and bare assertions.

what Spinoza does here is propose different interpretations of the subject proposal

and what this argument demonstrates is that any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

his ‘true and bare assertions’ – the results of his critical examination of the subject proposals – are only true – if affirmed –

 and as for ‘bare’ – as with any proposal – these ‘bare’ proposals are open to question – and uncertain

 

[58] (1) Let us now pass on to the fictions concerned with essences only, or with some reality or existence simultaneously. (2) Of these we must specially observe that in proportion as the mind's understanding is smaller, and its experience multiplex, so will its power of coining fictions be larger, whereas as its understanding increases, its capacity for entertaining fictitious ideas becomes less. (3) For instance, in the same way as we are unable, while we are thinking, to feign that we are thinking or not thinking, so, also, when we know the nature of body we cannot imagine an infinite fly; or, when we know the nature of the soul, we cannot imagine it as square, though anything may be expressed verbally. (4) But, as we said above, the less men know of nature the more easily can they coin fictitious ideas, such as trees speaking, men instantly changed into stones, or into fountains, ghosts appearing in mirrors, something issuing from nothing, even gods changed into beasts and men and infinite other absurdities of the same kind.

as the mind’s critical understanding increases – its capacity for entertaining propositional possibilities becomes greater

as to the proposal of an ‘infinite fly’ –

we would need to investigate the propositional context of such a proposal – we could ask – is meant as a statement of a physical body – or does it come out of some imaginative / artistic context?

in any case – as with any proposal – it is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

and as to the proposal ‘soul’ – why can’t we imagine it as square?

‘though anything may be expressed verbally’ –

yes – any proposal – verbal – pictorial – gestural – or in whatever form – is valid – can be put – and can be critically assessed

the less men critically examine the proposals they put – or the proposals put them – the less rational will be their view of the world

‘as trees speaking, men instantly changed into stones, or into fountains, ghosts appearing in mirrors, something issuing from nothing, even gods changed into beasts and men and infinite other absurdities of the same kind.’

these proposals – as with any – must be understood in terms of the propositional contexts they emerge from –

I doubt that anyone is suggesting that such proposals will function in a physicalist / empiricist / scientific context –

in any case these proposals and ‘absurdities of the same kind’ – are clearly open to question – open to doubt – open to interpretation – and uncertain

 

[59] (1) Some persons think, perhaps, that fiction is limited by fiction, and not by understanding; in other words, after I have formed some fictitious idea, and have affirmed of my own free will that it exists under a certain form in nature, I am thereby precluded from thinking of it under any other form. (2) For instance, when I have feigned (to repeat their argument) that the nature of body is of a certain kind, and have of my own free will desired to convince myself that it actually exists under this form, I am no longer able to hypothesize that a fly, for example, is infinite; so, when I have hypothesized the essence of the soul, I am not able to think of it as square, &c.

a lot depends here on just what is understood by a ‘form of nature’

I take the view that any proposal put by a human being is natural – and that is to say that a proposal put in an imaginative context is of the nature of the human being – and therefore of nature – in the same way as a proposal that comes out of an empirical / scientific context is of nature and is natural– and further that whatever the propositional context – a proposal is open to question – to doubt – and its uncertainty to be explored – which is to say that the critical capacity of human beings is a natural fact

I can understand a proposal put in terms of an empirical context – however I am not thereby precluded from understanding the proposal in terms of some other propositional context –

if you have an open and critical approach to proposals / propositions put – you can appreciate different interpretations and understandings – different propositional contexts –

it is only the closed dogmatic mind that is not able to think outside of its closed dogmatic box –

different propositional contexts speak to different propositional uses – all of which are natural to the human being

 

[60] (1) But these arguments demand further inquiry. (2) First, their upholders must either grant or deny that we can understand anything. If they grant it, then necessarily the same must be said of understanding, as is said of fiction. (3) If they deny it, let us, who know that we do know something, see what they mean. (4) They assert that the soul can be conscious of, and perceive in a variety of ways, not itself nor things which exist, but only things which are neither in itself nor anywhere else, in other words, that the soul can, by its unaided power, create sensations or ideas unconnected with things. (5) In fact, they regard the soul as a sort of god. (60:6) Further, they assert that we or our soul have such freedom that we can constrain ourselves, or our soul, or even our soul's freedom. (7) For, after it has formed a fictitious idea, and has given its assent thereto, it cannot think or feign it in any other manner, but is constrained by the first fictitious idea to keep all its other thoughts in harmony therewith. (8) Our opponents are thus driven to admit, in support of their fiction, the absurdities which I have just enumerated; and which are not worthy of rational refutation.

there are those who have proposed this view – and this proposal – as with any other is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

there is no ‘rational refutation’ – no refutation – in critical analysis –

‘refutation’ – as some final – incontrovertible judgment – is not a rational concept –

we can critically investigate a proposal and argue against it –

any proposed decision in relation to any proposal put – be it to accept or reject it – is – as with the subject proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

the rational reality is that any proposal – any view put – is worthy of critical consideration

 

[61] (1) While leaving such persons in their error, we will take care to derive from our argument with them a truth serviceable for our purpose, namely, that the mind, in paying attention to a thing hypothetical or false, so as to meditate upon it and understand it, and derive the proper conclusions in due order therefrom, will readily discover its falsity; and if the thing hypothetical be in its nature true, and the mind pays attention to it, so as to understand it, and deduce the truths which are derivable from it, the mind will proceed with an uninterrupted series of apt conclusions; in the same way as it would at once discover (as we showed just now) the absurdity of a false hypothesis, and of the conclusions drawn from it.

there is no genuine ‘discovery’ here – for in the first case it is assumed that what is being proposed is false – and in the second – that what is being proposed is true –and of course – in both cases – the conclusions follow

it is clear that in Spinoza’s view – ‘the mind’ – takes a view – true or false – and then simply fills out the picture with its ‘arguments’ –

there is no genuine questioning – no doubt regarding the starting point – and no exploration of uncertainty

what we have here is philosophical prejudice portrayed as a methodology –

philosophers of all persuasions have been getting away with this scam for centuries

 

[62] (1) We need, therefore, be in no fear of forming hypotheses, so long as we have a clear and distinct perception of what is involved. (2) For, if we were to assert, haply, that men are suddenly turned into beasts, the statement would be extremely general, so general that there would be no conception, that is, no idea or connection of subject and predicate, in our mind. (3) If there were such a conception we should at the same time be aware of the means and the causes whereby the event took place. (4) Moreover, we pay no attention to the nature of the subject and the predicate.

the proposal – ‘men are suddenly turned into beasts’ – as with any proposal – is valid – and open to question – open to doubt and uncertain –

‘a clear and distinct perception of what is involved’ – will – regardless of its clarity and distinctness – be open to question

Spinoza’s questioning here of the connection of subject and predicate in the proposition – is his way of raising a serious doubt regarding the logic of the proposition

a subject / predicate analysis of a proposition is quite valid – and is standard logical technique –

a proposition is a proposal – of any form –

or to put it another way – a proposal / a proposition is any response – in any form – to the unknown

in my view the subject / predicate analysis is just one conception – one analysis of the proposition –

and though it has proven to be most fruitful in logic and in other areas of philosophy – its adoption as an orthodoxy – to my mind – has led to a limited and distorted view of the nature of the proposition –

nevertheless – Spinoza’s argument here is fair enough and to the point – and worthy of consideration

my view is that – to properly critically evaluate this proposition – or for that matter – any proposal / proposition – we need to begin by considering the propositional context out of which it has emerged –

i.e. – in this connection we can ask – is it meant as an empirical statement – and if so – what has led to such an assertion – what is its basis – and what are the problems with it as an empirical proposal?

it may have come out of an imaginative / artistic / poetic context – and if so – any empirical consideration – is out of the question –

however – any evaluation of artistic proposals / propositions – will like empirical evaluations – involve question – doubt – and uncertainty

or it may have come out of some religious / spiritual propositional view of the world – and further investigation might show that it has an ethical dimension to it –

and such contexts – if they are dealt with rationally – will be subject to critical evaluation

the present context here – is philosophical / metaphysical – and it is clear that Spinoza has put this proposal in the service of his argument –

and we can inquire into whether it does serve his argument

the key thing to understand here is that a proposal – a proposition cannot legitimately be assessed and critically evaluated – independent of consideration of propositional context –

and further that any propositional context – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

[63] (1) Now, if the first idea be not fictitious, and if all the other ideas be deduced therefrom, our hurry to form fictitious ideas will gradually subside. (2) Further, as a fictitious idea cannot be clear and distinct, but is necessarily confused, and as all confusion arises from the fact that the mind has only partial knowledge of a thing either simple or complex, and does not distinguish between the known and the unknown, and, again, that it directs its attention promiscuously to all parts of an object at once without making distinctions, it follows, first, that if the idea be of something very simple, it must necessarily be clear and distinct. (3) For a very simple object cannot be known in part, it must either be known altogether or not at all.

‘fictitious ideas’ – are those idea / proposals – that are not held open to question – that are not held open to doubt – and regarded as certain

a proposal – as such – is neither ‘fictitious’ – or not fictitious –

the proposition as such – its logic – is that it is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

what determines the rationality of a proposal is how it is considered –

if critically evaluated – it is rationally considered –

if held beyond question – doubt and uncertainty – it is held irrationally –

fictitious idea will ‘gradually subside’ – when they are put to question

no proposal / proposition logically speaking is ‘clear and distinct’ – a proposal / proposition is uncertain

there is no complete knowledge – so all knowledge is partial

as to distinguishing between the known and the unknown –

what we know is what we propose – and what we propose is a response to the unknown – and our propositional responses are uncertain

we make propositional distinctions when we critically evaluate our proposals –

the proposal of a ‘simple object’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

which is to say the description ‘simple’ – is uncertain

 

[64] (1) Secondly, it follows that if a complex object be divided by thought into a number of simple component parts, and if each be regarded separately, all confusion will disappear. (2) Thirdly, it follows that fiction cannot be simple, but is made up of the blending of several confused ideas of diverse objects or actions existent in nature, or rather is composed of attention directed to all such ideas at once, and unaccompanied by any mental assent.

this ‘dividing of a complex object into a number of simple component parts’ – will be a result of a critical analysis of the proposed object –

whether or not confusion disappears is not the point –

the proposed analysis into component parts – as with the initial proposal – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

the blending of several ideas of diverse objects or actions in nature – may be a product of confusion – but it may be the result of creativity which might well result in discovery – the discovery of new connections – new hypotheses – new ways of proposing

in any case the propositional result confused or not – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

I don’t think it makes sense to say that one’s attention can be directed to all such ideas at once –

attention is proposition specific – whether the proposition is simple or complex

 

(64.1) Now a fiction that was simple would be clear and distinct, and therefore true, also a fiction composed only of distinct ideas would be clear and distinct, and therefore true. (4) For instance, when we know the nature of the circle and the square, it is impossible for us to blend together these two figures, and to hypothesize a square circle, any more than a square soul, or things of that kind.

a so called ‘clear and distinct’ proposal – is just as uncertain – as any other proposal – clarity is open to question – distinctness – is open to doubt

a proposal is true – if affirmed – for whatever reason – and any proposal of affirmation is open to question – is uncertain

the circle is a rule governed proposal – a game proposal – as is the square –

the rule of the circle is a different rule to that of the square –

‘circle’ and ‘square’ – are different propositional games –

there is no rule that ‘blends’ these two propositional games –

and to anyone who suggests a ‘square circle’ – I ask – what’s the rule – how is the square circle constructed – how is this propositional game played?

for without a rule governed proposal – there is no ‘square circle’ – no such game

 

[65] (1) Let us shortly come to our conclusion, and again repeat that we need have no fear of confusing with true ideas that which is only a fiction. (2) As for the first sort of fiction of which we have already spoken, when a thing is clearly conceived, we saw that if the existence of a that thing is in itself an eternal truth fiction can have no part in it; but if the existence of the conceived be not an eternal truth, we have only to be careful such existence be compared to the thing's essence, and to consider the order of nature. (3) As for the second sort of fiction, which we stated to be the result of simultaneously directing the attention, without the assent of the intellect, to different confused ideas representing different things and actions existing in nature, we have seen that an absolutely simple thing cannot be feigned, but must be understood, and that a complex thing is in the same case if we regard separately the simple parts whereof it is composed; we shall not even be able to hypothesize any untrue action concerning such objects, for we shall be obliged to consider at the same time the causes and manner of such action.

there is no eternal truth – the assigning of truth value to propositions is a temporal matter – open to question – and uncertain

the ‘essence’ of anything – of a proposal / proposition – is no more than the propositional responses to it

any proposed ‘order of nature’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

there is no ‘absolutely simple thing’/ absolutely simple proposition’ – ‘simple’ is a proposed description – open to question – and uncertain

and a ‘complex thing is in the same case’ –

the ‘causes and manner’ – of any actions concerning objects / propositions – from a logical point of view – is a matter open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

we are always able to hypothesize – to propose

and any hypothesis / proposal – can be affirmed or denied

 

IX. ON THE FALSE IDEA

 

[66] (1) These matters being thus understood, let us pass on to consider the false idea, observing the objects with which it is concerned, and the means of guarding ourselves from falling into false perceptions. (2) Neither of these tasks will present much difficulty, after our inquiry concerning fictitious ideas. (3) The false idea only differs from the fictitious idea in the fact of implying a mental assent--that is, as we have already remarked, while the representations are occurring, there are no causes present to us, wherefrom, as in fiction, we can conclude that such representations do not arise from external objects: in fact, it is much the same as dreaming with our eyes open, or while awake. (4) Thus, a false idea is concerned with, or (to speak more correctly) is attributable to, the existence of a thing whereof the essence is known, or the essence itself, in the same way as a fictitious idea.

for Spinoza the false idea – is that idea assented to for which there is no external cause

what we have here is a proposal assented to without an explanation in terms of an external object

any proposal can be assented to for whatever reason – and any proposal of assent – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

a proposal is false – if – for whatever reason it is dissented from – and any proposal of dissent – is likewise open to question – is uncertain

even where an external cause is proposed as a reason for assent – that proposal – like any other – is open to question –

the critical evaluation of dreams

and in the case of dreaming – any proposal that comes from the dream experience – is open to question – as psychoanalysts – prophets – and seers will testify

and it does happen that dreamers critically evaluate their dreams as they are experiencing them

‘where with the essence is known’ –

what is ‘known’ – is simply what is proposed

and if ‘essence’ is to have any meaning – the essence of anything – of any proposal – is however it is described – and any description – propositional description – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

no proposal – as such – is true or false –

truth and falsity are descriptions of propositional reactions to a proposal put

 

[67] (1) If attributable to the existence of the thing, it is corrected in the same way as a fictitious idea under similar circumstances. (2) If attributable to the essence, it is likewise corrected in the same way as a fictitious idea. (3) For if the nature of the thing known implies necessary existence, we cannot possible be in error with regard to its existence; but if the nature of the thing be not an eternal truth, like its essence, but contrariwise the necessity or impossibility of its existence depends on external causes, then we must follow the same course as we adopted in the of fiction, for it is corrected in the same manner.

what exists is what is proposed – existence is a proposal

any proposal – any proposed existent – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain –

there is no necessary proposal – there is no necessary existence

the notion of necessary existence comes out of logical / propositional ignorance

the ‘essence’ of anything is not an eternal truth

truth – the assigning of a truth value – is a temporal response to a proposal

the essence of anything – is its description – and any description is logically open to question

a thing exists – if proposed – and any such proposal – is open to question

an ‘external cause’ – is a proposal –

and any proposed external cause of a proposition – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

[68] (1) As for false ideas concerned with essences, or even with actions, such perceptions are necessarily always confused, being compounded of different confused perceptions of things existing in nature, as, for instance, when men are persuaded that deities are present in woods, in statues, in brute beasts, and the like; that there are bodies which, by their composition alone, give rise to intellect; that corpses reason, walk about, and speak; that God is deceived, and so on. (2) But ideas which are clear and distinct can never be false: for ideas of things clearly and distinctly conceived are either very simple themselves, or are compounded from very simple ideas, that is, are deduced therefrom. (3) The impossibility of a very simple idea being false is evident to everyone who understands the nature of truth or understanding and of falsehood.

the examples Spinoza gives of false ideas – as ‘being compounded of different confused perceptions’ – are examples of proposals – valid legitimate proposals

Spinoza’s problem is that he fails to see the propositional background or context of such proposals –

the proposal ‘deities are present in the woods, in statues, in brute beasts and the like’ – comes out of some religious / spiritual context

‘that there are bodies which, by their composition alone, give rise to the intellect’ – is a valid and well-argued proposal in the philosophy of mind – albeit a view of the mind-body relationship that Spinoza does not accept

to give proper consideration to any proposal – we begin by asking in what context a proposal – a proposition – might function?

the proposal ‘that corpses reason, walk about, and speak’ – does not make sense in an empirical scientific context – but does in the context of imaginative horror literature

and as for ‘God is deceived’ – a proposition – I would suggest – for the theologians to wrangle with

all these proposals in context – can be critically evaluated

Spinoza goes on to say – ‘But ideas which are clear and distinct can never be false’ –

any idea / proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

and a propositional actor can give his or her assent to a proposal – can dissent from it – or can leave it undecided – for whatever reason –

and any proposal of assent – dissent – or indecision – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

as to ‘clear and distinct’ – just what ‘clear and distinct’ amounts to is likewise – open to question

‘The impossibility of a very simple idea being false is evident to everyone who understands the nature of truth or understanding and of falsehood.’

‘a very simple idea’ – as with any proposal – any proposition – is open to question

simplicity is not a bar to dissent

 

[69] (1) As regards that which constitutes the reality of truth, it is certain that a true idea is distinguished from a false one, not so much by its extrinsic object as by its intrinsic nature. (2) If an architect conceives a building properly constructed, though such a building may never have existed, and may never exist, nevertheless the idea is true; and the idea remains the same, whether it be put into execution or not. (3) On the other hand, if anyone asserts, for instance, that Peter exists, without knowing whether Peter really exists or not, the assertion, as far as its asserter is concerned, is false, or not true, even though Peter actually does exist. (4) The assertion that Peter exists is true only with regard to him who knows for certain that Peter does exist.

no idea is true or false ‘in itself’ – by its ‘intrinsic nature’ – or indeed by its ‘extrinsic nature’ –

an idea / proposal has no truth value until a truth value is ascribed to it – that is proposed – by a propositional actor –

and any proposed truth value is revisable – that is to say – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

yes – if an architect proposes a building – though such a building may never have existed – all you have is a proposal – a proposal for building

now the proposal may be well thought out in architectural terms – but it is neither true or false as such

however – the proposal as put can be critically evaluated

if affirmed – it may well be proceeded with – if rejected – it will not be proceeded with as it stands

our knowledge is proposal – is propositional – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

the proposal that ‘Peter exists’ – as with any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

if one affirms the proposal ‘Peter exists’– the proposal is true – if the proposal is rejected – it is false

the proposal that ‘Peter exists’ – as with any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

if truth and falsity depended on so-called ‘certain knowledge’ – there would be no true propositions – no false propositions

 

[70] (1) Whence it follows that there is in ideas something real, whereby the true are distinguished from the false. (2) This reality must be inquired into, if we are to find the best standard of truth (we have said that we ought to determine our thoughts by the given standard of a true idea, and that method is reflective knowledge), and to know the properties of our understanding. (3) Neither must we say that the difference between true and false arises from the fact, that true knowledge consists in knowing things through their primary causes, wherein it is totally different from false knowledge, as I have just explained it: for thought is said to be true, if it involves subjectively the essence of any principle which has no cause, and is known through itself and in itself.

an idea – that is a proposal – posits a reality – but as to whether that reality is true or not – is a matter for those who witness the proposal –

if they operate rationally – they will question and explore the proposal –

and the object of any critical exploration is to decide whether to proceed with the proposal or not

if the proposal is affirmed – it will be proceeded with – if not affirmed – it will not be proceeded with

as to the best standard of truth – that is a matter open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

what we can say is that propositional actors do decide on the truth value of proposition –

and the reasons they have – well that is a natter for empirical investigation –

the logical point is that any reason for assigning a truth value to a proposition – is like the proposition itself – open to question

‘for thought is said to be true, if it involves subjectively the essence of any principle which has no cause, and is known through itself and in itself.’

‘a principle that has no cause and is known through itself and in itself’

any such ‘principle’ – is just another proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

[71] (1) Wherefore the reality (forma) of true thought must exist in the thought itself, without reference to other thoughts; it does not acknowledge the object as its cause, but must depend on the actual power and nature of the understanding. (2) For, if we suppose that the understanding has perceived some new entity which has never existed, as some conceive the understanding of God before He created thing (a perception which certainly could not arise any object), and has legitimately deduced other thoughts from said perception, all such thoughts would be true, without being determined by any external object; they would depend solely on the power and nature of the understanding. (3) Thus, that which constitutes the reality of a true thought must be sought in the thought itself, and deduced from the nature of the understanding.

Spinoza’s definition of truth – of the true idea – is a circular argument –

his idea is that the reality of a true idea exists in the true idea – this tells us nothing – all we have here is a play of words

the power of the understanding – is its critical power – that is – putting our proposals – our understandings to question – to doubt – and exploring their uncertainty

‘For, if we suppose that the understanding has perceived some new entity which has never existed, …’

this is just to put a proposal –

‘and has legitimately deduced other thoughts from said perception all such thoughts would be true, without being determined by any external object; they would depend solely on the power and nature of the understanding

all such proposals – as with the original proposal – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

the critical evaluation of such proposals will enable a rational decision regarding their truth value

Spinoza seems to think you can pick an idea – a thought – a proposal – out of thin air – assume its ‘truth’ – whatever that is supposed to be – play the deductive game and deduce more so called ‘true’ propositions from it –

what he is suggesting is that rational understanding is an empty game – and empty language game –

this might work for a computer – and a computer program – but not for human beings – not for propositional actors who have the capacity for critical evaluation – who can deal with and explore the uncertainty of our propositional reality

 

[72] (1) In order to pursue our investigation, let us confront ourselves with some true idea, whose object we know for certain to be dependent on our power of thinking, and to have nothing corresponding to it in nature. (2) With an idea of this kind before us, we shall, as appears from what has just been said, be more easily able to carry on the research we have in view. (3) For instance, in order to form the conception of a sphere, I invent a cause at my pleasure--namely, a semicircle revolving round its center, and thus producing a sphere. (4) This is indisputably a true idea; and, although we know that no sphere in nature has ever actually been so formed, the perception remains true, and is the easiest manner of conceiving a sphere. (5) We must observe that this perception asserts the rotation of a semicircle--which assertion would be false, if it were not associated with the conception of a sphere, or of a cause determining a motion of the kind, or absolutely, if the assertion were isolated. (6) The mind would then only tend to the affirmation of the sole motion of a semicircle, which is not contained in the conception of a semicircle, and does not arise from the conception of any cause capable of producing such motion.

Spinoza’s ‘conception of a sphere’ – his – ‘indisputably a true idea’ – is an example of a propositional game –

in propositional activity we operate with two propositional modes – the critical mode and the game mode

propositional games are ruled-governed propositional activities –

if you play the game – you play in accordance with the rules of the game – in this case the rule for the construction of a sphere

if you don’t follow the rule – there is no game – there is no sphere

a game – a propositional game is neither true or false –

truth value does not apply to rule governed propositional games –

truth value applies to proposals / propositions – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain –

which is to say the sphere in question is neither true nor false –

it is simply a rule-governed construction – which we have found has various uses

the assertion of the rotation of a semi-circle – is an example of a rule governing the construction of the sphere

 

(72:7) Thus falsity consists only in this, that something is affirmed of a thing, which is not contained in the conception we have formed of that thing, as motion or rest of a semicircle. (8) Whence it follows that simple ideas cannot be other than true--e.g., the simple idea of a semicircle, of motion, of rest, of quantity, &c.

well – the ‘simple idea’ of semi-circle – is a rule-governed propositional construction – a propositional game

motion – rest – and quantity – as calculations – likewise – are rule-governed –

a rule-governed propositional construction – is neither true or false –

you follow the rule – or you don’t

if you don’t there is construction

 

(72:8) Whatsoever affirmation such ideas contain is equal to the concept formed, and does not extend further. (10) Wherefore we form as many simple ideas as we please, without any fear of error.

any idea / proposal – described as ‘simple’ – or not – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

a propositional game – simple or not – is rule-governed –

when you play such a game – you do not question – you do not doubt the rules of the game –

for if you do there is no game –

you play or you don’t –

these rule-governed propositional activities have been developed by human beings – for their function and their utility

mathematics and geometry can be regarded as critical activities – but if so – you are not doing mathematics or geometry as such – you are engaged in questions regarding the epistemology of these activities – the philosophical foundations of these rule-governed propositional activities

 

[73] (1) It only remains for us to inquire by what power our mind can form true ideas, and how far such power extends. (2) It is certain that such power cannot extend itself infinitely. (3) For when we affirm somewhat of a thing, which is not contained in the concept we have formed of that thing, such an affirmation shows a defect of our perception, or that we have formed fragmentary or mutilated ideas. (4) Thus we have seen that the notion of a semicircle is false when it is isolated in the mind, but true when it is associated with the concept of a sphere, or of some cause determining such a motion. (5) But if it be the nature of a thinking being, as seems, prima facie, to be the case, to form true or adequate thoughts, it is plain that inadequate ideas arise in us only because we are parts of a thinking being, whose thoughts--some in their entirety, others in fragments only--constitute our mind.

in logical terms – the power of the mind – is its critical power

all ideas / proposals are limited – they cannot be otherwise

the proposal of a semi-circle – will not be understood outside of a relevant context – i.e. – mathematical – geometrical – or physical

it is the nature of the thinking being to propose – and to critically evaluate proposals

whether a thought / proposition – is true or adequate – is a matter to be critically assessed

any proposal put – in so far as it is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain – is – in Spinoza’s terms – inadequate

Spinoza’s proposal here – that we are parts of a thinking being – whose thoughts – some in their entirety – others in fragments – constitute the human mind – is – as with any proposal – valid – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

[74] (1) But there is another point to be considered, which was not worth raising in the case of fiction, but which give rise to complete deception--namely, that certain things presented to the imagination also exist in the understanding--in other words, are conceived clearly and distinctly. (2) Hence, so long as we do not separate that which is distinct from that which is confused, certainty, or the true idea, becomes mixed with indistinct ideas. (3) For instance, certain Stoics heard, perhaps, the term "soul," and also that the soul is immortal, yet imagined it only confusedly; they imaged, also, and understood that very subtle bodies penetrate all others, and are penetrated by none. (74:4) By combining these ideas, and being at the same time certain of the truth of the axiom, they forthwith became convinced that the mind consists of very subtle bodies; that these very subtle bodies cannot be divided &c.

this stoic proposal – that the mind consists of very subtle bodies and that these very subtle bodies cannot be divided – is a valid proposal – and as with any proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

[75] (1) But we are freed from mistakes of this kind, so long as we endeavor to examine all our perceptions by the standard of the given true idea. (2) We must take care, as has been said, to separate such perceptions from all those which arise from hearsay or unclassified experience. (3) Moreover, such mistakes arise from things being conceived too much in the abstract; for it is sufficiently self-evident that what I conceive as in its true object I cannot apply to anything else. (4) Lastly, they arise from a want of understanding of the primary elements of nature as a whole; whence we proceed without due order, and confound nature with abstract rules, which, although they be true enough in their sphere, yet, when misapplied, confound themselves, and pervert the order of nature. (5) However, if we proceed with as little abstraction as possible, and begin from primary elements--that is, from the source and origin of nature, as far back as we can reach --we need not fear any deceptions of this kind.

any proposal – regardless of how it is classified or described – is valid – and is open to question – open to doubt -and uncertain

an abstract conception / proposal – is not a ‘mistake’ – in fact there are no mistakes in propositional life – only uncertainties

‘what I conceive as in its true object’ – is no more than a proposal – and ‘true’ here functions only as rhetoric

the fact is Spinoza – has no definition of ‘true’ – his ‘true’ a rhetorical con – the point of which is only to say his ideas are beyond question – beyond doubt – and certain – end of story –

his philosophy is dogmatism – and his argument – propaganda

‘confounding nature with abstract rules’ –

an ‘abstract rule’ – is a proposal

it is open to question whether or not an ‘abstract rule’ / proposal will be of use in any consideration of or investigation into nature –

the matter has to be critically examined –

there are no deceptions in any propositional discovery or investigation – just uncertainties to be explored –

this proposal of ‘beginning with primary elements’ is fair enough as it stands –

however – any proposed ‘primary element’ – will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

76] (1) As far as the knowledge of the origin of nature is concerned, there is no danger of our confounding it with abstractions. (2) For when a thing is conceived in the abstract, as are all universal notions, the said universal notions are always more extensive in the mind than the number of individuals forming their contents really existing in nature. (3) Again, there are many things in nature, the difference between which is so slight as to be hardly perceptible to the understanding; so that it may readily happen that such things are confounded together, if they be conceived abstractedly. (4) But since the first principle of nature cannot (as we shall see hereafter) be conceived abstractedly or universally, and cannot extend further in the understanding than it does in reality, and has no likeness to mutable things, no confusion need be feared in respect to the idea of it, provided (as before shown) that we possess a standard of truth. (5) This is, in fact, a being single and infinite (6); in other words, it is the sum total of being, beyond which there is no being found.

knowledge of the origin of nature – will be a proposal –

and any such proposal – will involve explanations – that is further proposals – which may well involve abstractions – abstract proposals

an abstraction – is a proposal – a way of describing / explaining proposed relations between other proposals

an explanatory proposal – will be an attempt to give a general description which will apply to different individuals – different proposals

Spinoza speaks of possessing ‘a standard of truth’ – but we have no account from him of this standard

the first principle of nature?

for Spinoza that is – a being single and infinite – in other words the sum total of being – beyond which there is no being found –

this proposal – this first principle is open to question

it strikes me that at the heart of it there is a contradiction –

we can ask – how can there be a sum total – if nature is infinite?

the point being – an infinity – or infinite sequence – has no total –

and as for ‘the infinite’ – like ‘God’ – it is just another characterization / description of the unknown

as I see it – nature – or reality – in the absence of proposal – is the unknown

we make known through proposal – and any proposal put – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

X. ON THE DOUBTFUL IDEA

 

[77] (1) Thus far we have treated of the false idea. We have now to investigate the doubtful idea--that is, to inquire what can cause us to doubt, and how doubt may be removed. (2) I speak of real doubt existing in the mind, not of such doubt as we see exemplified when a man says that he doubts, though his mind does not really hesitate. (3) The cure of the latter does not fall within the province of method, it belongs rather to inquiries concerning obstinacy and its cure.

our proposals – our propositions – are uncertain – which is to say they are open to question – and open to doubt

doubt is a natural response to our propositional reality –

and is the ground of any critical evaluation of our propositional reality – and as such the ground of our rationality

a bit rich of Spinoza to be saddling doubt with obstinacy – when his philosophy is a paradigm of obstinacy

the cure for obstinacy – is doubt 

 

[78] (1) Real doubt is never produced in the mind by the thing doubted of. (2) In other words, if there were only one idea in the mind, whether that idea were true or false, there would be no doubt or certainty present, only a certain sensation. (3) For an idea is in itself nothing else than a certain sensation. (4) But doubt will arise through another idea, not clear and distinct enough for us to be able to draw any certain conclusions with regard to the matter under consideration; that is, the idea which causes us to doubt is not clear and distinct. (5) To take an example. (6) Supposing that a man has never reflected, taught by experience or by any other means, that our senses sometimes deceive us, he will never doubt whether the sun be greater or less than it appears. (7) Thus rustics are generally astonished when they hear that the sun is much larger than the earth. (8) But from reflection on the deceitfulness of the senses (8) doubt arises, and if, after doubting, we acquire a true knowledge of the senses, and how things at a distance are represented through their instrumentality, doubt is again removed.

if there were only one idea in the mind – that idea / proposal – would be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

if by clear and distinct is meant ‘certain’ – no idea is ‘clear and distinct’

the point is not to do with experience – it is a matter of propositional logic – that a proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

one can always put a proposal to question – to doubt

and so – a person who has never been ‘taught that our senses sometimes deceive us’ – if rational man or woman – he or she can question whether the sun is greater or lesser than it appears –

the senses are only ‘deceitful’ – if your perspective is non-sensual –

any proposal – from whatever propositional perspective – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

doubt is only ever removed by ignorance

 

[79] (1) Hence we cannot cast doubt on true ideas by the supposition that there is a deceitful Deity, who leads us astray even in what is most certain. (2) We can only hold such an hypothesis so long as we have no clear and distinct idea--in other words, until we reflect the knowledge which we have of the first principle of all things, and find that which teaches us that God is not a deceiver, and until we know this with the same certainty as we know from reflecting on the nature of a triangle that its three angles are equal to two right angles. (3) But if we have a knowledge of God equal to that which we have of a triangle, all doubt is removed. (4) In the same way as we can arrive at the said knowledge of a triangle, though not absolutely sure that there is not some arch-deceiver leading us astray, so can we come to a like knowledge of God under the like condition, and when we have attained to it, it is sufficient, as I said before, to remove every doubt which we can possess concerning clear and distinct ideas.

we don’t need a deceitful deity to validate and recognize doubt –

doubt is the ground and action of our propositional lives

you can propose a God – and further that God is not a deceiver –

these proposals are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

the triangle is a rule governed propositional construction

the rule is that its three angles are equal to two right angles

the triangle is an example of a propositional game –

if you play the game – you play in accordance with its rule –

without its rule – there is no game – no construction – no triangle

human beings operate with two propositional modes – the critical mode – and the game mode –

this is how we are – this is how we operate – how we live

when we operate critically – we put our proposals / propositions – to question – to doubt – we explore their uncertainty

when we operate in the game mode – we play in terms of the rule of the game –

you can question a game-rule – but this is not playing a game – this is not constructing a triangle

coming to a certainty – be of God – or whatever – is the great retreat from rationality – it is to make a stand for the irrational – for ignorance

doubt is never removed – it is only denied

 

[80] (1) Thus, if a man proceeded with our investigations in due order, inquiring first into those things which should first be inquired into, never passing over a link in the chain of association, and with knowledge how to define his questions before seeking to answer them, he will never have any ideas save such as are very certain, or, in other words, clear and distinct; for doubt is only a suspension of the spirit concerning some affirmation or negation which it would pronounce upon unhesitatingly if it were not in ignorance of something, without which the knowledge of the matter in hand must needs be imperfect. (2) We may, therefore, conclude that doubt always proceeds from want of due order in investigation.

it is not a matter of ‘inquiring first into those things which should first be inquired into’ –

there are no things that should be inquired into first – there are no first things

we inquire – critically investigate – as we go – as we explore – and yes – as a result of any critical investigation we may follow up on an initial focus – and continue our investigation

‘never passing over a link in the chain of association’ –

the only ‘chain of association’ – will be a proposed chain of association – open to question –

we are free to investigate as we will –

as to – ‘define his questions before seeking to answer them’ –

a question seeks definition – if we think a question misses the mark – we ask another question

any idea proposed – is not certain – it is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

doubt is suspension – not repression – concerning some affirmation or negation

the epistemological reality is that we are always in ignorance of something –

however – the real point here is that any proposal / proposition – is open – open to question – open to doubt and is uncertain

he who hesitates – thinks

all proposal / knowledge – is imperfect

doubt is the ground and engine of any critical investigation

 

XI. ON MEMORY AND FORGEFULNESS – CONCLUSION

 

[81] (1) These are the points I promised to discuss in the first part of my treatise on method. (2) However, in order not to omit anything which can conduce to the knowledge of the understanding and its faculties, I will add a few words on the subject of memory and forgetfulness. (3) The point most worthy of attention is, that memory is strengthened both with and without the aid of the understanding. (4) For the more intelligible a thing is, the more easily is it remembered, and the less intelligible it is, the more easily do we forget it. (5) For instance, a number of unconnected words is much more difficult to remember than the same number in the form of a narration.

I don’t think we can make such generalizations regarding memory –

what people remember – how they remember – is really a subject for empirical investigation

 

[82] (1) The memory is also strengthened without the aid of the understanding by means of the power wherewith the imagination or the sense called common, is affected by some particular physical object. (2) I say particular, for the imagination is only affected by particular objects. (3) If we read, for instance, a single romantic comedy, we shall remember it very well, so long as we do not read many others of the same kind, for it will reign alone in the memory (4) If, however, we read several others of the same kind, we shall think of them altogether, and easily confuse one with another. (82:5) I say also, physical. (6) For the imagination is only affected by physical objects. (7) As, then, the memory is strengthened both with and without the aid of the understanding, we may conclude that it is different from the understanding, and that in the latter considered in itself there is neither memory nor forgetfulness.

it may be the case that someone who reads a single romantic comedy – remembers it well – if he doesn’t read many others – but whether this is always the case with all readers – is open to question

whether or not a reader gets confused by reading several books of the same kind – will be an individual matter –

there may well be other readers who do not get confused

‘physical objects’ – are proposals –

the imagination is affected by proposals

as to how memory is strengthened – that is an empirical issue –

what we remember is propositions – is propositional – and as such – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

the understanding – is the critical activity of question – of doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty

 

[83] (1) What, then, is memory? (2) It is nothing else than the actual sensation of impressions on the brain, accompanied with the thought of a definite duration, (3) of the sensation. (3) This is also shown by reminiscence. (4) For then we think of the sensation, but without the notion of continuous duration; thus the idea of that sensation is not the actual duration of the sensation or actual memory. (5) Whether ideas are or are not subject to corruption will be seen in philosophy. (6) If this seems too absurd to anyone, it will be sufficient for our purpose, if he reflect on the fact that a thing is more easily remembered in proportion to its singularity, as appears from the example of the comedy just cited. (7) Further, a thing is remembered more easily in proportion to its intelligibility; therefore we cannot help remember that which is extremely singular and sufficiently intelligible.

from the point of view of propositional logic – a memory is a proposal – a recalled proposal / proposition open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

under what conditions a memory is recalled – and the question of how easily a memory is recalled is an empirical matter

any empirical proposal put – on these matters is – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 [84] (1) Thus, then, we have distinguished between a true idea and other perceptions, and shown that ideas fictitious, false, and the rest, originate in the imagination--that is, in certain sensations fortuitous (so to speak) and disconnected, arising not from the power of the mind, but from external causes, according as the body, sleeping or waking, receives various motions. (2) But one may take any view one likes of the imagination so long as one acknowledges that it is different from the understanding, and that the soul is passive with regard to it. (3) The view taken is immaterial, if we know that the imagination is something indefinite, with regard to which the soul is passive, and that we can by some means or other free ourselves therefrom with the help of the understanding. (4) Let no one then be astonished that before proving the existence of body, and other necessary things, I speak of imagination of body, and of its composition. (5) The view taken is, I repeat, immaterial, so long as we know that imagination is something indefinite, &c.

how an idea – proposal / proposition – arises – is logically irrelevant

any proposal – regardless of its propositional origin – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

any so-called external cause – is a proposal – open to question

a proposal – in itself – is not true or false – or fictitious –

the truth value of a proposal / proposition – is a propositional response to the subject proposal

if the response is one of affirmation – the proposal is regarded as true – if the response is denial – the proposal is regarded as false

we proceed with a true proposition – and we drop from consideration a false proposition

however – any proposal of affirmation or denial is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘the imagination’ – is a propositional classification of proposals – used by those who wish distinguish different types of proposals –

such classification may be useful in certain propositional contexts –

but any such classification – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

the understanding – is the critical activity of question – of doubt – and the exploration of propositional activity

if rational – the soul is not passive

which is to say – the putting of proposals / propositions – and the critical evaluation of proposals – is action – is active

Spinoza ends here by saying that the imagination is something indefinite – and presumably he is here distinguishing it from that which is definite

if ‘definite’ means ‘certain’ – then there are no definite propositions – as a proposition is open to question – and is logically uncertain

 

[85] (1) As regards as a true idea, we have shown that it is simple or compounded of simple ideas; that it shows how and why something is or has been made; and that its subjective effects in the soul correspond to the actual reality of its object. (2) This conclusion is identical with the saying of the ancients, that true proceeds from cause to effect; though the ancients, so far as I know, never formed the conception put forward here that the soul acts according to fixed laws, and is as it were an immaterial automaton.

‘simple’ or ‘compound’ – are propositional descriptions – analytical descriptions or classifications of a proposal –

these propositional descriptions are made – if they are made – because they are deemed useful in some propositional construction and / or investigation

any such propositions descriptions / classifications – are open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

any proposal as to ‘how and why something is or has been made’ – is open to question

and ‘the actual reality of its object’ – is a proposal – open to question – as are proposed ‘subjective affects’ – of the proposal –

the subjective / objective distinction here – is a well-entrenched epistemological / metaphysical proposal –

and as the history of philosophy shows – it is vigorously critically evaluated against alternative idealist proposals

the causal proposal has proved most useful in propositional life – but as with any proposal – it is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

and the idea / proposal that the ‘soul’ acts according to fixed laws – is fair enough – is a valid proposal – and open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

by ‘soul’ – does he mean ‘mind’ – ‘inner life’ – something physical – something spiritual? 

whatever the case – we are dealing with propositional uncertainty

 

[86] (1) Hence, as far as is possible at the outset, we have acquired a knowledge of our understanding, and such a standard of a true idea that we need no longer fear confounding truth with falsehood and fiction. (2) Neither shall we wonder why we understand some things which in nowise fall within the scope of the imagination, while other things are in the imagination but wholly opposed to the understanding, or others, again, which agree therewith. (3) We now know that the operations, whereby the effects of imagination are produced, take place under other laws quite different from the laws of the understanding, and that the mind is entirely passive with regard to them.

there is no ‘confounding truth with falsehood and fiction’ –

we affirm a proposition – or we deny it – it is as simple and clear cut as that

as for ‘fiction’ – we can affirm or deny fiction – i.e. – I proceed with a work of fiction – or I decide not to

any proposal of affirmation / truth – or any proposal of denial / false – is open to question –

whatever we imagine – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

the understanding just is this critical process – of question – of doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty

we are passive – when we do not critically evaluate our proposals

 

[87] (1) Whence we may also see how easily men may fall into grave errors through not distinguishing accurately between the imagination and the understanding; such as believing that extension must be localized, that it must be finite, that its parts are really distinct one from the other, that it is the primary and single foundation of all things, that it occupies more space at one time than at another and other similar doctrines, all entirely opposed to truth, as we shall duly show.

there are no ‘grave errors’ for men to fall into –

there is no error – only uncertainty

we are propositional animals – we put proposals – and we propose descriptions of them – i.e. – ‘imaginative’ – and understanding – is the critical process of question – of doubt and the exploration of uncertainty

the idea / proposal – that the extension must be localized – that it must be limited – that its parts are really distinct one from the other – that it is the primary and single foundation of all things – that it occupies more space at one time than at another – is a legitimate and valid proposal – and one that Spinoza has questioned –

I don’t see any argument from Spinoza against this proposal – all I have seen from Spinoza – is his assertion that it is false – and that is fair enough – he doesn’t agree with it –

we can ask here – what is Spinoza’s argument for the opposite – alternative view?

is it not just another bald assertion?

I really have no argument with how Spinoza sees the world – in fact I find his vision to be an original and brilliant contribution to our propositional world

the problem is that he fails to see that his view – as with any other – is open to question – open to doubt and is uncertain

 

[88] (1) Again, since words are a part of the imagination--that is, since we form many conceptions in accordance with confused arrangements of words in the memory, dependent on particular bodily conditions,--there is no doubt that words may, equally with the imagination, be the cause of many and great errors, unless we are strictly on our guard.

words are proposals – and open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

human language is I think the primary mode of propositional delivery and action – but really any form of response to the unknown is a proposal – is a proposition

and again – there are no errors – only propositional uncertainties –

and it is in language that we primarily explore propositional uncertainties

 

[89] (1) Moreover, words are formed according to popular fancy and intelligence, and are, therefore, signs of things as existing in the imagination, not as existing in the understanding. (2) This is evident from the fact that to all such things as exist only in the understanding, not in the imagination, negative names are often given, such as incorporeal, infinite, &c. (3) So, also, many conceptions really affirmative are expressed negatively, and vice versa, such as uncreate, independent, infinite, immortal, &c., inasmuch as their contraries are much more easily imagined, and, therefore, occurred first to men, and usurped positive names. (4) Many things we affirm and deny, because the nature of words allows us to do so, though the nature of things does not. (5) While we remain unaware of this fact, we may easily mistake falsehood for truth.

logically speaking – words are proposals – and however propositionally categorized – i.e. – ‘in the imagination’ – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘the understanding’ – is the critical process of question – of doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty

Spinoza’s distinction between the imagination and the understanding is wrong –

the putting of proposal – is not to be contrasted with – the critical evaluation of proposal – however the proposal is further described –

proposal and critical evaluation – are different but complementary activities –

and so – it can be said that the imagination and the understanding are complementary propositional activities

so-called ‘negative names’ – result from critical analysis

conceptions / proposals – as such – are neither positive or negative

‘incorporeal’ – ‘uncreate’ – ‘independent’ – ‘infinite’ – ‘immortal’ – are proposals –

proposals open to question – which in any critical analysis may well be contrasted with ‘their contraries’ – their opposites –

this idea that their contraries are more easily imagined – is rubbish –

we only move to a ‘contrary’ in response to a so called ‘positive’ – for it has to be a contrary to something in the first place

‘Many things we affirm and deny, because the nature of words allows us to do so, though the nature of things does not’

when faced with any proposal / proposition – we have the options of affirming it –denying it – or leaving it undecided

if you affirm the proposal – you proceed with it –

if you deny the proposal – you drop it from consideration –

if you leave it undecided – you don’t affirm or deny it

any proposal – and any proposed affirmation or denial – is open to question –

what is proposed is what exists –

which is to say – what exists – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

existence is uncertain

 

[90] (1) Let us also beware of another great cause of confusion, which prevents the understanding from reflecting on itself. (2) Sometimes, while making no distinction between the imagination and the intellect, we think that what we more readily imagine is clearer to us; and also we think that what we imagine we understand. (3) Thus, we put first that which should be last: the true order of progression is reversed, and no legitimate conclusion is drawn.

the imagination and the intellect – are categories – or classifications of proposals / propositions

these category descriptions function in certain propositional structures –

as with any propositional description – they are open to question –

and any proposal of clarity – is open to question –

and we understand when we critically evaluate

a proposal is what comes first – and if we are acting rationally – we follow up with critically evaluation

there are no final – as in certain – conclusions in a rational propositional life

 

XII. SECOND PART OF THE METHOD – ON DOUBLE PERCEPTION

 

[91] (1) Now, in order at length to pass on to the second part of this method, I shall first set forth the object aimed at, and next the means for its attainment. (2) The object aimed at is the acquisition of clear and distinct ideas, such as are produced by the pure intellect, and not by chance physical motions. (3) In order that all ideas may be reduced to unity, we shall endeavor so to associate and arrange them that our mind may, as far as possible, reflect subjectively the reality of nature, both as a whole and as parts.

what does Spinoza mean by ‘clear and distinct’?

on his view a clear and distinct idea is one produced by the ‘pure intellect’ – ‘and not by chance physical motions’

note – that to this point – he gives no account of what this ‘pure intellect’ – is supposed to be

‘chance physical motions’ –

as to ‘chance’ –

Spinoza I would think is a determinist – if so – does he see ‘chance’ – as not a real occurrence – but as a misunderstanding of how things are?

or is he here – in fact taking a chance with chance?

as with ‘pure intellect’ – at this stage – we have no account of ‘chance’ – and no account of how it fits into his metaphysics

in any case – the key point is – whether described as ‘chance’ or ‘determined’ – an idea / proposal – or proposed relation – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

an idea / proposal produced by physical motions – is an idea / proposal – that it is proposed has a relation to other proposals – proposals described as ‘physical’ –

and here I presume the propositional the relation Spinoza is proposing is a causal relation – though we can ask – does it make sense to speak of chance in causation?

the thing is – the proposed ‘origin’ of an idea / proposal – i.e. – ‘pure intellect’ or ‘chance physical motion’ – is logically irrelevant

what is relevant – is that the idea / proposed – however described – i.e. – as ‘clear and distinct’ or ‘confused’ – is critically evaluated – is put to question – put to doubt – its uncertainty explored

‘In order that all ideas may be reduced to unity, we shall endeavor so to associate and arrange them that our mind may, as far as possible, reflect subjectively the reality of nature, both as a whole and as parts’

reducing ideas to a unity – is a propositional practise that may suit some propositional endeavours

‘reflecting subjectively the reality of nature’ –

in propositional action – we propose our reality – and we propose how reality is structured – i.e. – subjective / objective – and we then go on to critically assess these proposed relations

proposed reductions – reflections – and relations – will suit certain propositional contexts and activities –

and it is in the critical evaluation of these propositional actions that we explore our reality

 

[92] (1) As for the first point, it is necessary (as we have said) for our purpose that everything should be conceived, either solely through its essence, or through its proximate cause. (2) If the thing be self-existent, or, as is commonly said, the cause of itself, it must be understood through its essence only; if it be not self-existent, but requires a cause for its existence, it must be understood through its proximate cause. (3) For, in reality, the knowledge, of an effect is nothing else than the acquisition of more perfect knowledge of its cause.

everything conceived solely through its essence – or proximate cause?

conceiving something through its essence – is proposing a description of it –

and any so-called essence / description – is open to question – is uncertain

a proposed proximate cause – if critically examined – will be seen to be uncertain

‘cause of itself’ –

a thing is only a ‘cause of itself’ – if it is not seen as part of a causal chain –

that is – if it is not causally explained or accounted for – i.e. – where you propose the thing – without a causal explanation

and so ‘cause of itself’ – is a false and duplicitous use of the notion of cause

if you run with the cause / effect proposal / explanation – the so-called ‘effect’ – will point to a cause – but whether the effect leads to a ‘more perfect knowledge’ of the cause is open to question

i.e.– you might simply propose a cause – without knowing anything about it – or you might propose a cause recognizing that your knowledge of it is incomplete – or indeed uncertain

and what of this ‘more perfect knowledge’?

how can there be a ‘more perfect’ anything?

I would have thought that ‘perfect’ – is an absolute – and that ‘more perfect’ – if it means anything – is a relative notion –

and if that is the case – ‘perfect’ – comes off as an uncertainty

 

[93] (1) Therefore, we may never, while we are concerned with inquiries into actual things, draw any conclusion from abstractions; we shall be extremely careful not to confound that which is only in the understanding with that which is in the thing itself. (2) The best basis for drawing a conclusion will be either some particular affirmative essence, or a true and legitimate definition. (3) For the understanding cannot descend from universal axioms by themselves to particular things, since axioms are of infinite extent, and do not determine the understanding to contemplate one particular thing more than another.

‘that which is only in the understanding’ – and ‘the thing in itself’?

‘that which is only in the understanding’ – is what we propose – and our evaluation of that proposed

as to – ‘the thing in itself’ –

the thing in itself – is an unknown – is the unknown –

we propose against the unknown – to make known –

‘our abstractions’ – are proposals

our proposals are our knowledge –

and our knowledge is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

there is no confounding of our propositional action – and that to which it is directed – the unknown

‘some particular affirmative essence or a true and legitimate definition’ –

however dressed up – however described – what we have with an ‘affirmative essence’ – or a definition – is proposal – is proposition – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

any conclusion drawn – is likewise – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

‘universal axioms’ – if regarded as proposals – beyond question – as certain – are propositional frauds –

however – as rules to propositional games – i.e. mathematics or geometry – they do have function

the understanding is not a rule governed activity – it is the critical evaluation of proposals / propositions put

 

[94] (1) Thus the true method of discovery is to form thoughts from some given definition. (2) This process will be the more fruitful and easy in proportion as the thing given be better defined. (3) Wherefore, the cardinal point of all this second part of method consists in the knowledge of the conditions of good definition, and the means of finding them. (4) I will first treat of the conditions of definition.

we ‘form thoughts’ – that is we put proposals – and it is in the critical evaluation of our proposals that we embark on discovery – propositional discovery

a definition is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘the process will be more fruitful’ – the better we critically evaluate

any proposal regarding the conditions of good definition – will be open to question – will be uncertain

 

XIII. ON THE CONDITIONS OF DEFINITION.

 

[95] (1) A definition, if it is to be called perfect, must explain the inmost essence of a thing, and must take care not to substitute for this any of its properties. (2) In order to illustrate my meaning, without taking an example which would seem to show a desire to expose other people's errors, I will choose the case of something abstract, the definition of which is of little moment. (3) Such is a circle. (4) If a circle be defined as a figure, such that all straight lines drawn from the center to the circumference are equal, every one can see that such a definition does not in the least explain the essence of a circle, but solely one of its properties. (5) Though, as I have said, this is of no importance in the case of figures and other abstractions, it is of great importance in the case of physical beings and realities: for the properties of things are not understood so long as their essences are unknown. (6) If the latter be passed over, there is necessarily a perversion of the succession of ideas which should reflect the succession of nature, and we go far astray from our object.

‘A definition, if it is to be called perfect, must explain the inmost essence of a thing’

a ‘definition’ – is a proposal – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

there is no perfection in propositional activity – propositional activity is uncertain

what is this ‘innermost essence of a thing’? 

a ‘thing’ is a proposal – and a proposed ‘inner most essence’ if it is to be anything – will be a description of the thing / proposal – a description – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

this definition of the circle –

‘If a circle be defined as a figure, such that all straight lines drawn from the center to the circumference are equal’ –

there are two modes of propositional activity – the critical mode – and the game mode

the circle is a rule-governed propositional action – in short – a propositional game –

the definition Spinoza gives – is the rule of this propositional action – this game –

in the game mode – that is if you play the game – rules are not up for question –

you may well question the rule – but in so doing – you are not playing the game – and in this case of the circle – it means you are not doing geometry

rules may be regarded as definitions – game definitions –

Spinoza says of such definitions –

‘every one can see that such a definition does not in the least explain the essence of a circle, but solely one of its properties’

it is not clear from Spinoza what the essence is – that – he does not define – but any proposal put here – will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘for the properties of things are not understood so long as their essences are unknown’

if I was to use this concept of ‘essence’ – I would say the essence of any thing / proposal is unknown – is the unknown –

that we make known through proposal – and the critical evaluation of proposal –

as for the ‘succession of ideas reflecting the succession of nature’ –

‘succession’ – will be a proposal regarding the ordering of ideas and things – and of course any such proposal will be open to question

if you take the view that anything in nature reflects nature – then any proposal put reflects nature – and any critical action in relation to a proposal put – reflects nature

 

[96] In order to be free from this fault, the following rules should be observed in definition:-

I. (1) If the thing in question be created, the definition must (as we have said) comprehend the proximate cause. (2) For instance, a circle should, according to this rule, be defined as follows: the figure described by any line whereof one end is fixed and the other free. (3) This definition clearly comprehends the proximate cause.

II. (4) A conception or definition of a thing should be such that all the properties of that thing, in so far as it is considered by itself, and not in conjunction with other things, can be deduced from it, as may be seen in the definition given of a circle: for from that it clearly follows that all straight lines drawn from the center to the circumference are equal. (5) That this is a necessary characteristic of a definition is so clear to anyone, who reflects on the matter, that there is no need to spend time in proving it, or in showing that, owing to this second condition, every definition should be affirmative. (6) I speak of intellectual affirmation, giving little thought to verbal affirmations which, owing to the poverty of language, must sometimes, perhaps, be expressed negatively, though the idea contained is affirmative.

the definition of the circle – as Spinoza notes is a rule –

rules function in propositional games – the circle – is a rule-governed propositional game –

a proximate cause – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

a game-rule – is not open to question – and is not a proximate cause

a definition is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

deduction is a rule governed propositional game –

proof is a rule-governed propositional game

a proposal – is not a rule

we can affirm – deny – or leave undecided any proposal put –

affirmation – whether so called ‘intellectual’ – or verbal – or in any other form – is the decision to proceed

we do not affirm – deny or leave undecided a propositional game – if we are to play it – we follow its rule

if we don’t follow its rule – we don’t play it – there is no game

Spinoza here shows a complete disregard for critical thinking –

it is clear that his model for understanding reality is the rule-based game –

rule based propositional games play a significant part in our propositional lives –

propositional actors invent rule-based games – and these games are played for their utility and their pleasure – be they intellectual games such as deduction and proof – mathematics and geometry – or common games such as chess – or the games of different sports –

following a rule does not lead to understanding –

understanding comes out of critical evaluation – the critical evaluation of propositional actions

 

[97] The rules for the definition of an uncreated thing are as follows:--

I. The exclusion of all idea of cause--that is, the thing must not need explanation by Anything outside itself.

II. When the definition of the thing has been given, there must be no room for doubt as to whether the thing exists or not.

III. It must contain, as far as the mind is concerned, no substantives which could be put into an adjectival form; in other words, the object defined must not be explained through abstractions.

IV. Lastly, though this is not absolutely necessary, it should be possible to deduce from the definition all the properties of the thing defined.

All these rules become obvious to anyone giving strict attention to the matter.

what exists is what is proposed – and as such a proposal is a creation – therefore the idea of an uncreated thing – of an uncreated proposal – makes no sense

any proposal – can exist – without explanation

a proposal by its nature – is open to doubt – is uncertain –

a proposal / proposition – in so far as it is open to question – can be explained in any manner of ways

a definition – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

any deducted properties of a thing / proposal defined – will already be contained in the definition – deduction produces nothing

 

[98] (1) I have also stated that the best basis for drawing a conclusion is a particular affirmative essence. (2) The more specialized the idea is, the more it is distinct, and therefore clear. (3) Wherefore a knowledge of particular things should be sought for as diligently as possible.

a particular affirmative essence – can be seen as ‘specialized’ – and as ‘more distinct and therefore clear’

nevertheless – it is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

any proposal put – should be critically evaluated – ‘as diligently as possible’

 

XIV. ON THE MEANS BY WHICH ETERNAL THINGS ARE KNOWN

 

[99] (1) As regards the order of our perceptions, and the manner in which they should be arranged and united, it is necessary that, as soon as is possible and rational, we should inquire whether there be any being (and, if so, what being), that is the cause of all things, so that its essence, represented in thought, may be the cause of all our ideas, and then our mind will to the utmost possible extent reflect nature. (2) For it will possess, subjectively, nature's essence, order, and union. (3) Thus we can see that it is before all things necessary for us to deduce all our ideas from physical things--that is, from real entities, proceeding, as far as may be, according to the series of causes, from one real entity to another real entity, never passing to universals and abstractions, either for the purpose of deducing some real entity from them, or deducing them from some real entity. (4) Either of these processes interrupts the true progress of the understanding.

look – the proposal that there is a being that is the cause of all our ideas – is a valid and legitimate proposal – but this proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

and I fail to see how – if you run with this proposal – that it solves the question – of how to proceed in our propositional deliberations – for any proposal as to how to proceed will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

the point here is – that the proposal – ‘a being that is the cause of all our ideas’ – gets left way behind – and is irrelevant – when we get into the thick of any critical methodological analysis

causal analysis – may well be useful – but it does not escape critical attention –

deduction is a rule-governed propositional – language game – that is of no value – and of no use – in any critical analysis

‘never passing to universals and abstractions’ –

if the real issue here is ‘the true progress of understanding’ – then we can avail ourselves with whatever propositional resources we consider might be of value and of use – and that may include universal proposals and propositional abstractions

there are no rules in critical thinking

and it is only in critical thinking that we can have any real progress in understanding

 

[100] (1) But it must be observed that, by the series of causes and real entities, I do not here mean the series of particular and mutable things, but only the series of fixed and eternal things. (2) It would be impossible for human infirmity to follow up the series of particular mutable things, both on account their multitude, surpassing all calculation, and on account of the infinitely diverse circumstances surrounding one and the same thing, any one of which may be the cause of its existence or non-existence. (3) Indeed, their existence has no connection with their essence, or (as we have said already) is not an eternal truth.

fixed and eternal things? – it would be good to know what these are –

it is not impossible ‘to follow up the series of particular mutable things’ –

‘these particular mutable things’ – are the proposals / propositions – we follow up with every day – with question – doubt and the exploration of their uncertainty

‘both on account of their multitude, surpassing all calculation, and on account of the infinitely diverse circumstances surrounding one and the same thing, any one of which may be the cause of its existence or non-existence’

yes – we can see propositional reality – as a multitude of proposals – and propositional possibilities – ‘surpassing all calculation’ – however we don’t deal with this – what we deal with – is what is before us – the propositions we put and the propositions put to us –

‘the infinitely diverse circumstance surrounding one and the same thing’ –

yes – you could see it that way – but such a view likely leads to propositional paralysis –

we deal with what is actually presented to us – not the infinitely diverse –

and we deal with what is presented to us – the proposals / propositions presented to us – in a critical manner –

what exists is what is proposed –

that not proposed – does not exist

the essence of any thing is a propositional description – open to question

the ‘essence’ of propositional reality – is uncertainty

as for ‘eternal truths’ –

this proposal is not elaborated on – or explained by Spinoza – so effectively he has shielded it from critical evaluation –

nevertheless – we can consider what it might mean –

if by ‘eternal’ – one means ‘outside of time’ – then it makes no sense to speak of  ‘eternal’ – for there is nothing outside of time –

and furthermore – any proposed truth is temporal –

that is to say – all propositional action takes place in time

 

[101] (1) Neither is there any need that we should understand their series, for the essences of particular mutable things are not to be gathered from their series or order of existence, which would furnish us with nothing beyond their extrinsic denominations, their relations, or, at most, their circumstances, all of which are very different from their inmost essence. (2) This inmost essence must be sought solely from fixed and eternal things, and from the laws, inscribed (so to speak) in those things as in their true codes, according to which all particular things take place and are arranged; nay, these mutable particular things depend so intimately and essentially (so to phrase it) upon the fixed things, that they cannot either be conceived without them.

‘This inmost essence must be sought solely from fixed and eternal things, and from the laws, inscribed (so to speak) in those things as in their true codes according to which all particular things take place and are arranged’

Spinoza proposes –‘fixed and eternal things’ – so what are they?

to date all we have from Spinoza is this assertion of ‘fixed and eternal thing’ – with no indication of what they are –

it is starting to look as if Spinoza – wants there to be fixed and eternal things – but cannot produce them –

and that nevertheless – he is quite happy to pretend they exist – and quite happy to continue the charade

 

[102] (1) But, though this be so, there seems to be no small difficulty in arriving at the knowledge of these particular things, for to conceive them all at once would far surpass the powers of the human understanding. (2) The arrangement whereby one thing is understood, before another, as we have stated, should not be sought from their series of existence, nor from eternal things. (3) For the latter are all by nature simultaneous. (4) Other aids are therefore needed besides those employed for understanding eternal things and their laws. (5) However, this is not the place to recount such aids, nor is there any need to do so, until we have acquired a sufficient knowledge of eternal things and their infallible laws, and until the nature of our senses has become plain to us.

as to Spinoza proposal of ‘eternal things’ –

‘eternal things’ – one would say by definition – exist – outside of time –

yet Spinoza says of his ‘eternal things’ – ‘For the latter [eternal things] are all by nature simultaneous.’

simultaneity is the concept of two or more events happening at the exact time –

so – there is a contradiction in Spinoza’s ‘eternal things’ – for they cannot be said to exist outside of time – and yet be things that happen in time – at the same time

Spinoza says – ‘other aids’ – are needed for the understanding eternal things and their laws – but this is not the place to recount such aids until we have acquired sufficient knowledge of eternal things and their infallible laws – and the nature of our senses has been made plain to us

so – all we have so far – from Spinoza – on ‘eternal things’ – is a contradiction and a rain check

 

[103] (1) Before betaking ourselves to seek knowledge of particular things, it will be seasonable to speak of such aids, as all tend to teach us the mode of employing our senses, and to make certain experiments under fixed rules and arrangements which may suffice to determine the object of our inquiry, so that we may therefrom infer what laws of eternal things it has been produced under, and may gain an insight into its inmost nature, as I will duly show. (2) Here, to return to my purpose, I will only endeavor to set forth what seems necessary for enabling us to attain to knowledge of eternal things, and to define them under the conditions laid down above.

Spinoza says here – he will now set forth what seems necessary for enabling us to attain knowledge of eternal things –

 

[104] (1) With this end, we must bear in mind what has already been stated, namely, that when the mind devotes itself to any thought, so as to examine it, and to deduce therefrom in due order all the legitimate conclusions possible, any falsehood which may lurk in the thought will be detected; but if the thought be true, the mind will readily proceed without interruption to deduce truths from it. (2) This, I say, is necessary for our purpose, for our thoughts may be brought to a close by the absence of a foundation.

it is clear from this that Spinoza thinks the deduction is the way to truth –

he fails to see that deduction is a rule-governed propositional game – a language game that actually does not produce anything – for any conclusion in a deduction – is already to be found in the premises

also – his concept of truth is wrong –

ideas / proposals – do not contain truth or falsity –

truth and falsity – are propositional acts of affirmation or denial that are put in response to a proposal –

and any propositional act of affirmation or denial – as with the subject proposal / proposition – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

his final point here is that thought / proposal requires a foundation

if by ‘foundation’ he means some kind of certainty – then there is no rational foundation –

certainty is prejudice – certainty is ignorance –

our proposals / propositions – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

there is no foundation to propositional activity – to propositional life

 

[105] (1) If, therefore, we wish to investigate the first thing of all, it will be necessary to supply some foundation which may direct our thoughts thither. (2) Further, since method is reflective knowledge, the foundation which must direct our thoughts can be nothing else than the knowledge of that which constitutes the reality of truth, and the knowledge of the understanding, its properties, and powers. (3) When this has been acquired we shall possess a foundation wherefrom we can deduce our thoughts, and a path whereby the intellect, according to its capacity, may attain the knowledge of eternal things, allowance being made for the extent of the intellectual powers.

a proposal is a reaction to – a response to the unknown

a proposal / proposition is the ground of our reality – and a proposal / proposition –is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

is Spinoza prepared to accept uncertainty as his foundation?

our knowledge is propositional – is uncertain

it is propositional uncertainty that directs our thoughts

deduction – produces nothing – nothing that has not already been proposed –

Spinoza thinks a foundation plus deduction will lead to eternal things

again – we don’t know what these eternal things are – and furthermore – so far – we have no idea of what Spinoza’s ‘foundation’ is supposed to be

 

XV. ON THE POWER OF THE UNDERSTANDING AND ITS PROPERTIES

 

106] (1) If, as I stated in the first part, it belongs to the nature of thought to form true ideas, we must here inquire what is meant by the faculties and power of the understanding. (2) The chief part of our method is to understand as well as possible the powers of the intellect, and its nature; we are, therefore, compelled (by the considerations advanced in the second part of the method) necessarily to draw these conclusions from the definition itself of thought and understanding.

the power of the understanding – is its critical power

we are never ‘compelled’ to draw any conclusion – and any proposed conclusion is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

and we can ask Spinoza – what are these conclusions that he says we are compelled to draw?

 

[107] (1) But, so far as we have not got any rules for finding definitions, and, as we cannot set forth such rules without a previous knowledge of nature, that is without a definition of the understanding and its power, it follows either that the definition of the understanding must be clear in itself, or that we can understand nothing. (2) Nevertheless this definition is not absolutely clear in itself; however, since its properties, like all things that we possess through the understanding, cannot be known clearly and distinctly, unless its nature be known previously, understanding makes itself manifest, if we pay attention to its properties, which we know clearly and distinctly. (3) Let us, then, enumerate here the properties of the understanding, let us examine them, and begin by discussing the instruments for research which we find innate in us. See [31]

Spinoza here reverts to the question of the definition of the understanding –

and in this connection says –

‘Nevertheless this definition is not absolutely clear in itself; however, since its properties, like all things that we possess through the understanding, cannot be known clearly and distinctly, unless its nature be known previously, understanding makes

itself manifest, if we pay attention to its properties, which we know clearly and distinctly’ –

this statement strikes me as confusing – he begins by saying the properties of the understanding – cannot be known clearly and distinctly – unless its nature be previously known

he then says – understanding makes itself manifest – if we pay attention to its properties that we know clearly and distinctly

so – we can ask – are its properties known clearly and distinctly or not?

and understanding – making itself ‘manifest’ – leads to what? – a definition?

it is not clear to me just what Spinoza is looking for here – and I wonder if he really knows himself –

however – with respect to the question of the definition of the understanding – the key thing to understand is – the understanding just is the critical process of question – of doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty

 

[108] (1) The properties of the understanding which I have chiefly remarked, and which I clearly understand, are the following:--

I. (2) It involves certainty--in other words, it knows that a thing exists in reality as it is reflected subjectively.

a ‘thing’ is proposal – whether proposed objectively or subjectively – or proposed as a relation between the subject and object

and however proposed – if dealt with rationally – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

Spinoza simply asserts ‘certainty’ – at no stage does he give an account – and explanation pf certainty

in his philosophy – certainty is an empty concept

II. (3) That it perceives certain things, or forms some ideas absolutely, some ideas from others. (4) Thus it forms the idea of quantity absolutely, without reference to any other thoughts; but ideas of motion it only forms after taking into consideration the idea of quantity.

the understanding is the critical activity of question – of doubt – and the exploration of uncertainty –

ideas / proposals – of quantity – ideas proposals of motion – are put – and are open to question

III. (5) Those ideas which the understanding forms absolutely express infinity; determinate ideas are derived from other ideas. (6) Thus in the idea of quantity, perceived by means of a cause, the quantity is determined, as when a body is perceived to be formed by the motion of a plane, a plane by the motion of a line, or, again, a line by the motion of a point. (7) All these are perceptions which do not serve towards understanding quantity, but only towards determining it. (8) This is proved by the fact that we conceive them as formed as it were by motion, yet this motion is not perceived unless the quantity be perceived also; we can even prolong the motion to form an infinite line, which we certainly could not do unless we had an idea of infinite quantity.

the idea of infinity – is a proposal – open to question

the critical examination of any proposal may well lead to other proposals and to propositional relations – which are put to question –

physics is a propositional activity – all its ideas / concepts / proposals – and procedures are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

IV. (9) The understanding forms positive ideas before forming negative ideas.

a negative or critical response to a proposal is only possible once the proposal has been put

V. (10) It perceives things not so much under the condition of duration as under a certain form of eternity, and in an infinite number; or rather in perceiving things it does not consider either their number or duration, whereas, in imagining them, it perceives them in a determinate number, duration, and quantity.

‘eternity’ can be proposed – and a proposal of ‘infinite number’ can be put – these proposals are open to question – and uncertain –

any proposal described as ‘imaginative’  – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

VI. (11) The ideas which we form as clear and distinct, seem to follow from the sole necessity of our nature, that they appear to depend absolutely on our sole power; with confused ideas the contrary is the case. (12) They are often formed against our will.

any idea / proposal – is uncertain – whether described as ‘clear and distinct’ – or ‘confused’

VII. (13) The mind can determine in many ways the ideas of things, which the understanding forms from other ideas: thus, for instance, in order to define the plane of an ellipse, it supposes a point adhering to a cord to be moved around two centers, or, again, it conceives an infinity of points, always in the same fixed relation to a given straight line, angle of the vertex of the cone, or in an infinity of other ways.

as a result of critical evaluation – a proposal – may well be understood – in terms of other proposals

VIII. (14) The more ideas express perfection of any object, the more perfect are they themselves; for we do not admire the architect who has planned a chapel so much as the architect who has planned a splendid temple

the idea of ‘more perfect’ – leads directly to propositional uncertainty

 

[109] (1) I do not stop to consider the rest of what is referred to thought, such as love, joy, &c. (2) They are nothing to our present purpose, and cannot even be conceived unless the understanding be perceived previously. (3) When perception is removed, all these go with it.

‘love’ and ‘joy’ – are proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

[110] (1) False and fictitious ideas have nothing positive about them (as we have abundantly shown), which causes them to be called false or fictitious; they are only considered as such through the defectiveness of knowledge. (2) Therefore, false and fictitious ideas as such can teach us nothing concerning the essence of thought; this must be sought from the positive properties just enumerated; in other words, we must lay down some common basis from which these properties necessarily follow, so that when this is given, the properties are necessarily given also, and when it is removed, they too vanish with it.

an idea / proposal – is false – if dissented from – and any proposal of dissent – is open to question

knowledge is proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

where knowledge becomes defective is when it is held to be certain –

there is no logical certainty – certainty is the refuge of prejudice and ignorance

the essence of thought is uncertainty –

the properties or characteristics of rational thought – are to be found in its critical capacity

there is no necessity – only uncertainty

 

The rest of the treatise is wanting.

 

Spinoza’s argument in this treatise depends for its coherence and force on his ideas of eternal things – and eternal truths

he does not identify or explain eternal things or eternal truth                                                                                                                              

furthermore – he is unable to establish his concept of certainty

nevertheless – this treatise – despite any short-comings – if understood as a proposal – a complex proposal – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain – offers us an original and impressive vision of reality that is more than worthy of our critical attention

 

greg. t. charlton. 

st kilda 02/09/2025

(c) killer press 2025.